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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1994, California Governor Pete Wilson signed into
law the bill with a one-line zinger for a name: Three Strikes and
You're Out (three strikes or Statute).' While the catch-phrase "three
strikes" has enjoyed immense popularity,2 the substance of the Statute
has inspired the following responses:
1. Daniel M. Weintraub, '3 Strikes' Law Goes into Effect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at
Al.
The three strikes bill passed by the legislature amended California Penal Code § 667.
Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, § 1, 1994 Cal. Stat. 56-59 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667
(West Supp. 1995)). Three strikes was enacted once again, with minor changes, on Novem-
ber 8, 1994, by voter initiative as Proposition 184. Final California Election Returns, L.A.
TImEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at A23. The Statute is now codified at California Penal Code
§ 1170.12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995). [All further references to Cali-
fornia Penal Code § 1170.12 will be to West Supp. 1995.]
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory subsection references will be to California
Penal Code § 1170.12, and all statutory section references will be to the California Penal
Code.
2. As of July 28, 1994, 86% of the public registered recognition of the Three Strikes
and You're Out initiative, as opposed to 37%, 38%, and 41% for the other three ballot
initiatives. Edward Epstein, Poll Finds Few Voters Know About Fall Initiatives: 'Three
Strikes' Measure Is the Only Exception, S.F. CHRON., July 28, 1994, at A17.
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"It's appalling that something so poorly written could be foisted
on the public."
3
"This is so poorly drafted, it is the full employment bill for
lawyers."4
"I favor a three-strikes law, but it must be a rational policy and
focus on serious and violent offenders, not something like [a theft of
old clothing]." 5
"The people who pushed this (law) through have treated us as if
we were the enemy."
'6
These are not the opinions of bleeding-heart champions of
criminals' rights, but of the very prosecutors whose job it is to put law
breakers away. While district attorneys, including the ones quoted
above, support the three-strikes concept,7 the Statute itself has caused
dismay and consternation among participants in every phase of crimi-
nal prosecution.' This Comment describes how three strikes was born
of impassioned outrage and then, under election-year pressures,
rammed through the legislature despite warnings of drafting errors
and unworkable provisions.9 The Statute was then adopted by voter
initiative ° in an election characterized by an angry electorate."
The result is a law whose scatter-gun, shot-in-the-dark approach
is the statutory equivalent of the $500 hammer. 2 Just as the wide
availability of ten-dollar hammers makes it outrageous to spend
nearly $500 of taxpayers' hard-earned money on equivalent hammers,
the cost and inefficiency, and even counter-efficiency, of three strikes
3. Harriet Chiang, Law Frustrates Prosecutors: Chaotic Enforcement of '3 Strikes',
S.F. CHRON., June 30, 1994, at Al, A8 (quoting San Mateo district attorney James Fox).
4. Tupper Hull, '3 Strikes' Backers Fight On: State Senate Votes for Identical Bill; De-
spite Warnings, S.F. EXAMRMR, Feb. 18, 1994, at A25 (quoting Ventura County district
attorney Michael Bradbury).
5. Adam Pertman & Jonathan S. Franklin, '3 Strikes' Laws Lead to Some Snarled
Prosecutions, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 1994, at 1, 12 (quoting San Francisco district attor-
ney Arlo Smith).
6. Reynolds Holding, Lawyers Expect Legal Battle on '3 Strikes', S.F. CHRON., Mar. 9,
1994, at Al (alteration in original) (quoting Contra Costa deputy district attorney Douglas
Pipes).
7. Dan Morain, Lawmakers Jump on '3 Strikes' Bandwagon, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31,
1994, at A3.
8. See Richard L. Colvin & Ted Rohrlich, Courts Toss Curves at '3 Strikes', L.A.
TiMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at Al.
9. See infra part II.
10. Final California Election Returns, supra note 1, at A23.
11. Democratic Wipeout, Voter Anger and California's Challenge, L.A. TImEs, Nov. 10,
1994, at B6.
12. See Ruth Ryon, Keynoter Advocates Spending Cuts, L.A. TIms, Oct. 6, 1985, at 8
(Real Estate) (noting that government paid $471 for hammer).
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is also outrageous when compared to what California could have
had.'" Among its flaws, three strikes allows the worst offenders to get
out of prison in less than twenty-one years;14 it defeats marginal deter-
rence;' 5 it decreases sentences in many second-strike cases;16 and it
preempts the death penalty. 7 And just as the defense that the $500
hammer really does drive nails is grossly insufficient, so too is the de-
fense that three strikes really does prevent crime-far better results
could have, and should have, been obtained.
And not only is three strikes a galloping boondoggle, it is one that
is riddled with excruciating errors in drafting'8 and ambiguities of in-
tent,19 that, if not for the Statute's actual enactment, could only be
described as comical.
Lastly, and most importantly, three strikes contains provisions
which offend both conscience and Constitution: It perverts the rela-
tion between crime and punishment,20 and denies equal protection 2'
and due process.'
The Statute, it will be shown, could not, or at least should not,
have been passed on its merits. Its passage, rather, is a reflection of
the legislature's pavlovian response to the uproar-du-jour: It was the
one habitual offender bill which could be invoked in two words, and
described in one sentence. The fact that it was later passed by voter
initiative does not absolve legislators-it is their job to defeat bad leg-
islation, not encourage it.
13. See infra part IV.
14. See infra part IV.A.1.
15. See infra part IV.B.2.a.
16. See infra part IV.A.3.
17. See infra part IV.A.4.
18. Among the more innocuous errors is the following example: Paragraph (a)(2) pro-
vides that "[p]robation for the current offense shall not be granted, nor shall execution or
imposition of the sentence be suspended for any prior offense." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(a)(2). The California Judicial Council's Standing Advisory Committee gives this
response: "The phrase 'prior offense' technically is incorrect because the court in sentenc-
ing the defendant on the current violation does not sentence on the prior offense." Memo-
randum from the Judicial Council of California Criminal Standing Advisory Committee to
Presiding Judges and Sole Judges of the Trial Courts 4 (Mar. 18, 1994) (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Judicial Council Memorandum].
19. See Judicial Council Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3-13 (identifying 26 un-
resolved issues).
20. See infra part IV.
21. See infra part VI.
22. See infra part VII.
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II. Tim BmTH OF TmzE STmEs
A. A Daughter Is Murdered
The story of three strikes begins on the night of June 29, 1992, the
night Joe Davis tried to snatch Kimber Reynolds's purse?3 Kimber
was a bright, energetic eighteen year old-she had earned good
grades, been elected to her high school senate, and played varsity ten-
nis.24 After graduating from high school, she left her home in Fresno
to attend the Fashion Institute of Design and Merchandising, located
in a tough part of downtown Los Angeles.25
But it was not in the big city that Kimber was attacked-she had
returned home to Fresno that June to attend a wedding as a brides-
maid.2 6 On the night of the attack, Kimber had just finished having
dinner with a friend at a local restaurant, and was about to climb back
into her parked car when Davis and an accomplice approached on a
stolen motorcycle 27 Davis made a grab for Kimber's purse; when she
put up a struggle, Davis put a .357 magnum to her head, pulled the
trigger, and sped away. 8 Left behind was Kimber Reynolds, mortally
wounded, purse lying nearby.29
A short time later, Mike Reynolds, Kimber's father, would be
awakened by a phone call informing him that his daughter had been
shot.30 Kimber would die two days later.31
B. A Statute Is Born
Mike Reynolds's grief soon turned to outrage. Joe Davis, it
turned out, was a drug dealer who, despite a history of violent crime,
had been released on parole just two months earlier.32 And, Reynolds
soon found, Davis was not unique. A recent study conducted by the
RAND Corporation found that in California the average murderer
could expect to be incarcerated for a paltry 4.2 years, a robber 2.9
23. George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born from Pain, L.A. TrEs, Dec. 9, 1993, at
A3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Joe Davis died a few days later in a shoot-out with police. 1d.
32. Id.
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years, and one convicted of assault, a mere 2.6 years.33 The National
Center for Policy Analysis concluded that "'[t]he reason we have so
much crime is that for many people, the benefits outweigh the
costs.' "I Mike Reynolds decided he was going to raise the costs-
"'I just don't want others to go through the same sadness my family
has endured,'" he said.'
Reynolds, who earned his living as a photographer,36 put together
a statute of siren-song simplicity. It would, in brief, double the de-
fendant's sentence upon a second felony conviction, and, upon a third
felony conviction, provide an indeterminate life term.37 The minimum
of the indeterminate life term was to be either triple what the sen-
tence otherwise would have been, or twenty-five years, whichever was
longer.38 There was no requirement that any of the felonies be vio-
lent; prior convictions could be of either violent or serious felonies,
and the current conviction39 could be for any felony.40 The Statute
also precluded sentences of probation,41 and counted juvenile adjudi-
cations42 as prior strikes.43 To this statute Reynolds attached a name
borrowed from a phrase familiar on the lips and in the ears of every
American: Three Strikes and You're Out.
The initial attempt to pass Reynolds's law in the California As-
sembly, sponsored by Assembly members Bill Jones and Jim Costa,44
was blocked by the Assembly Committee on Public Safety.45 Frus-
trated by the legislative process, Reynolds decided to pitch his law
33. PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE Our.
ESTIMATED BENFHIS AND COSTS OF CALuFORNiA's NEW MANDATORY SENTENCING LAW
58 (1994) (citing 1990 California Department of Corrections data).
34. Jerry Seper, System Fails to Stop Repeat Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at
A7 (quoting National Center for Policy Analysis).
35. Tupper Hull, A Father's Crusade to Lock Up Criminals, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8,
1993, at Al (quoting Mike Reynolds).
36. Skelton, supra note 23, at A3.
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c).
38. Il.
39. "Current conviction" is used to denote the conviction for Nyhich the defendant is
being sentenced under three strikes.
40. CAI. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a).
41. Id. § 1170.12(a)(2).
42. References to juvenile adjudications will be limited to those concerning juveniles
between 16 and 18 years of age, stemming from acts which would constitute crimes if com-
mitted by adults. S~e id. § 1170.12(b)(3)(A).
43. Id. § 1170.12(b)(3).
44. Telephone Interview with Rod Rimmer, Member, Three Strikes and You're Out
Committee (Sept. 16, 1994).
45. Skelton, supra note 23, at A3.
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directly to the people through a voter initiative.' Using support from
the National Rifle Association, the Gun Owners of California, and the
California prison guard union, along with his own savings, Reynolds
began circulating petitions to place his law on the November 1994
ballot.47
The initiative was given a huge boost in October of 1993 when
Polly Klaas, a twelve-year-old Petaluma, California girl, was kid-
napped from her bedroom during a slumber party.48 She was later
found brutally murdered,49 and a transient with a string of convictions
for violent crimes admitted responsibility.50 Polly Klaas's kidnapping
and murder triggered an explosion of public fury against violent
crime. The day after Polly's body was found, so many people at-
tempted to call the Three Strikes and You're Out hotline that the en-
tire Fresno area "800" system was jammed.51
The public uproar sparked by Polly Klaas's murder spurred the
Assembly to reconsider Reynolds's law.52 It was reintroduced by
Jones and Costa as Assembly Bill 971, the widest-ranging of five com-
peting bills dealing with habitual offenders.5 3 And this time, in an
election year in which crime was far and away the most important
issue,5 4 few legislators dared stand in its way.55
In fact, legislators' fear of the public's anticrime fervor went be-
yond the possibility of being turned out of office. Tom Umberg, a
46. Dan Morain, A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al; Mo-
rain, supra note 7, at A3.
47. Morain, supra note 7, at A3. The National Rifle Association was so instrumental in
landing the three strikes initiative on the ballot that the initiative has been referred to as
the "Reynolds/NRA" initiative. CALIFORNIA ASSEmBLY WAYS AND MEANs COMm., COM-
MTEE REP. FOR 1993 CAL. ASSEMBLY BmL No. 971, 1993-94 Regular Sess., available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Cacomm File [hereinafter WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REP.].
48. Suspect Charged in Killing of Polly Klaas, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1994, at B8.
49. Richard C. Paddock et al., Klaas Suspect Twisted Legal System Since '70s, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1993, at Al.
50. It.
51. Morain, supra note 7, at A3.
52. Telephone Interview with Rod Rimmer, supra note 44.
53. The other bills were Assembly Bills 1568, 2429, 167, and 9X. CALIFORNIA SENATE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SENTENCING: THREE STRuKs 9-10 [hereinafter JUDICIARY COMM.
REP.].
54. Andy Furillo, Fear of Crime Grips Politics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 1994, at Al,
A20; see Jerry Gillam, Lawmakers Take Quick Aim at Crime, L.A. TimS, Jan. 4, 1994, at
A3 (reporting that Gov. Wilson called special legislative session concerning crime). The
issue of crime was later joined in the political spotlight by the furor over illegal immigra-
tion. See, e.g., Cathleen Decker, Rivals for Senate, Governor Battle Across State, L.A.
TiMEs, Nov. 7, 1994, at Al.
55. See Eric Bailey, Assembly Public Safety Committee Turns Tough, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1994, at A3, A34.
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member of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, received sev-
eral death threats after arguing against three strikes on radio talk
shows. 56 "'I'm going to vote for these turkeys,'" said state Senator
Leroy Greene, "'because my constituents want me to.' ,,57
With minimal opposition among legislators, the five bills sailed
through the Assembly committees without a hitch5 8 The Ways and
Means Committee approved the lot of them, despite not having an
answer as to how much they would cost taxpayers except that it would
be "in the billions."5 9 Even the liberal-dominated Committee on Pub-
lic Safety,60 which had blocked the Statute during its first introduction,
approved it by a vote of seven to one.6'
But even while three strikes was steamrolling through the legisla-
tive process, voices of warning were being raised.62 Legislators re-
ceived complaints that three strikes was sloppily drafted and would
result in needless litigation.63 "'I knew there were going to be some
big, big problems,'" said George Williamson, chief assistant to the
California Attorney General, despite his and his boss's support of the
Statute.64 "'We were aware that there were some drafting concerns
which were significant. We were also advised by line prosecutors that
they perceived some problems.' "65
Many of these errors were, and still are, quite obvious and could
easily have been corrected with the changing of a word, or a few
words. The warnings, however, were beaten back by the Statute's
champions, Bill Jones, Jim Costa, and Mike Reynolds, who success-
fully fought off every effort to amend their statute.66 "'It may not be
exactly what everyone wants,'" Jones later said, "'but there's no
56. Id. at A34.
57. Dan Morain, 'Three Strikes' Bill Clears State Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994,
at Al, A26 (quoting California state senator Leroy Greene).
58. Bailey, supra note 55, at A3. Richard K. Rainey, member of the Assembly Com-
mittee on Public Safety, reported that, " '[w]e're getting bills out I never thought we'd get
out.'" Id. (quoting Richard K. Rainey).
59. WAYS AND MEANS Comm. REP., supra note 47.
60. Morain, supra note 7, at A3.
61. WAYS AND MEANS Comm. REP., supra note 47.
62. The California District Attorneys Association opposed the Statute. Dan Morain,
Citing '3 Strikes,' Lawyers to Shun Plea Bargains, L.A. Tivmns, Mar. 9, 1994, at Al, A15.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting George Williamson, chief assistant to the California Attorney
General).
65. Id. (quoting George Williamson, chief assistant to the California Attorney
General).
66. Bill Ainsworth, Judicial Council Raises Doubt About 'Three Strikes' Law: Memo
Suggests Some Sections Could Be Unconstitutional, RECORDER (S.F.), Mar. 22, 1994, at 1.
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doubt that California now has the toughest criminal law in the
country.' 1267
Touted as "the toughest criminal law in the country," three
strikes, flaws and all, became the litmus test for toughness on crime.6 8
No matter what the opinions of the individual legislators were, their
votes were caught up in the tide of public opinion; a vote against three
strikes could only be seen as a vote for weakness, a vote for criminal
hugging. The glaring flaws in the Statute became inconsequential. As
one observer put it,
[t]he people are afraid of the criminals, and the politicians
are afraid of the people. So the politicians will vie to talk
toughest, good slogans will take the place of good policy and
bad ideas will be enacted. The politics of crime leaves no
room for a real discussion of policy, particularly when so few
leaders have the guts to be honest about crime.69
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown was among the few who had the
nerve and political standing to speak up.70 Brown expressed fear that,
because of the overwhelming public pressure, three strikes would be
passed without rational discourse.71 Legislators, according to Brown,
had shown" 'zero courage' " on three strikes because" 'they like their
jobs and want to be reelected.... We have all bailed out on this
one.' 572 When asked whether he would work to bring about the
needed discourse, he replied, "'I got out of the way of this train be-
cause I am a realist.' "7
Three strikes easily won this frenetic, headlong rush through the
legislature, passing in March 1994, and taking effect immediately.'
67. 1& (quoting California Assembly member Bill Jones).
68. "[I]t seems unlikely that an incumbent in a contested race would run the risk of
being perceived as soft on crime by supporting an option to the 'three strikes' law and
ballot initiative." Carl Ingram, Support Sought for '3 Strikes' Alternative, L.A. TImrs, June
10, 1994, at A3.
69. Susan Estrich, Politics of Crime Skips Over Issues, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1994,
at B7.
70. See William Endicott, Proportion vs. Politics, SACRAmENTo BEE, Jan. 15, 1994, at
A3; Jerry Gillam, Legislators Fear Public on '3 Strikes,' Brown Says, L.A. TraEs, Mar. 2,
1994, at A3.
71. Gillam, supra note 70, at A3.
72. Id (quoting California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown).
73. Id (quoting California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown).
74. Weintraub, supra note 1, at A21.
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The vote was overwhelming in both chambers: fifty-nine to ten in the
Assembly,75 and twenty-nine to seven in the Senate.
76
The passage of three strikes in the legislature, however, did not
quell the anticrime, antiviolence frenzy which had seized (and nearly
throttled) the California political scene. Politicians continued to stum-
ble over one another in their race to prove themselves tough, tougher,
toughest. In August of 1994, Governor Wilson, a Republican, staged
an anticrime rally to cheer legislators on as adjournment of the legisla-
tive session neared and the opportunities to pass additional crime bills
diminished.77 When supporters of Kathleen Brown, the Democratic
challenger for the Governor's seat, showed up to join the "bipartisan"
rally, they were ordered to lay down the anticrime signs they had
brought.78 At one point, the Governor's chief economist, Philip Ro-
mero, carrying his own sign, was seen jousting with Brown supporters
for position before news cameras.7 9 To borrow the words of one
newspaper, the political fur flew. 0
Neither did the legislature's passage of three strikes stop Mike
Reynolds's drive to have his law adopted into the state constitution
through a ballot initiative. The initiative, according to Reynolds, was
needed as insurance against what he saw as attempts to weaken or
undermine his law."' "'They've held [the four other bills] like a
trump card,'" said Reynolds. 82 "'They've forced our hand.' "83
But in light of the numerous shortcomings of three strikes, an
effort was made in the legislature to give voters a choice by placing an
alternative sentence enhancement initiative on the 1994 ballot. The
alternative initiative would focus on violent offenders like the ones
that killed Kimber Reynolds and Polly Klaas.84 Governor Wilson re-
sponded with a promise to veto any such effort a.8  A Wilson spokes-
75. Greg Lucas, Assembly Passes '3 Strikes' Bills, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1994, at A13.
76. Vlae Kershner, State Senate Approves '3 Strikes' by Big Margin, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
4, 1994, at A3.
77. Ken Chavez, Political Fur Flies at Wilson Anti-Crime Rally, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Aug. 9, 1994, at A3.
78. Id.
79. Id. Wilson's office later explained the scene by saying that the rally permit had
been obtained not by the Governor's office, but by a victims group, and that Wilson's own
people were warned not to carry signs. Id.
80. Id.
81. Weintraub, supra note 1, at Al (quoting Mike Reynolds).
82. Morain, supra note 57, at A26 (alteration in original) (quoting Mike Reynolds).
83. Id. (quoting Mike Reynolds).
84. See Ingram, supra note 68, at A3. The alternative proposal would require the cur-
rent conviction to be for a violent felony. Id.
85. Id.
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person, noting that over 800,000 signatures were gathered to place the
three strikes initiative on the ballot, said that the people "'have al-
ready spoken . . . . And there is a big difference between 800,000
people and a couple of legislators trying to trip up the governor.' "86
Wilson's veto promise was ultimately successful in keeping the alter-
native proposal off the 1994 ballot.87 "'Voters have a choice in No-
vember,' "said Costa, " '[t]hey can vote for [three strikes] or they can
vote against it.' "I On November 8, 1994, the three strikes initiative,
the only sentence enhancement initiative available to voters, was ap-
proved by seventy-two percent of the California electorate.89 By do-
ing so, the people of California adopted three strikes as a part of the
California Constitution,90 and a two-thirds vote of the Assembly will
be required to repeal or amend it.91
In discussing the shortcomings of three strikes, the issue is not
whether three strikes prevents crime. It does. 2 So do many other
anticrime proposals. 93 Rather, the question for Californians is this:
Which proposal would reduce the most crime, do it most effectively,
and do it without violating the California and U.S. Constitutions?
Three strikes accomplishes none of these rudimentary goals.
86. Hallye Jordan, Backers Defend Alternative to 'Three Strikes', L.A. DAtMY J., June
10, 1994, at 1, 5 (quoting Wilson spokesperson Paul Kranhold).
87. See id.
88. Ingram, supra note 68, at A29 (quoting California Assembly member Jim Costa).
89. Final California Election Returns, supra note 1, at A23.
90. Rene Lynch, '3 Strikes' Case Leniency Is Out in O.C., L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at
A41.
91. CAL- CO ST. art. XVIII, § 1.
92. GREENwOOD E-T AL., supra note 33, at 27-29. I feel a twinge of trepidation in writ-
ing that three strikes prevents crime. A Three Strikes and You're Out Committee circular
announced the Greenwood/RAND study under the bold-type headline: "RAND SAYS 3
STRIKES REDUCES SERIOUS CRIME BY ALMOST 30%." RAND Says 3 Strikes
Reduces Serious Crime by Almost 30% (Three Strikes and You're Out Committee, Sacra-
mento, Cal.), Sept. 21, 1994 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). In the text,
the Committee alludes to the negative conclusions of the study as "'a collection of half-
truths.'" Id. (quoting Mike Reynolds).
There is evidence that the crime rate has declined since the implementation of the
three strikes bill. Yvette Cabrera, Violent Crime Declines Sharply in Central L.A., L.A.
TirEs, Oct. 30, 1994, at 3 (City Tmes). But other evidence indicates that this downward
trend began long before the Statute's passage. Thaai Walker, Crime Down in Bay Area-
but Fear Stays High, S.F. CHR N., Jan. 10, 1994, at Al. The decrease therefore cannot be
attributed solely to three strikes.
In fact, there has been a general decline in felonies in major U.S. cities, whether or not
they are under a three strikes-type law. In a survey of the 22 largest cities, the New York
Police Department found that the rate of felonies has decreased in all but two. Clifford
Krauss, Urban Crime Rates Falling This Year, N.Y. TImsS, Nov. 8, 1994, at A14.
93. GREENWOOD Er AL., supra note 33, at xiii.
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HI. THE COST OF THREE STIKis: A DEBATE wITH BuT
ONE-AND-A-HALF SIDES
The concern most often expressed during the Statute's approval
process was that California, already in the throes of an economic
downturn, did not have the finances to house the increased prison
population which would result.94 While estimates have varied, the
general consensus is that costs of building the new prisons and housing
additional prisoners will be "in the billions." 95
Speculation on how many billions of dollars three strikes will
cost, however, has no importance beyond fiscal planning; as with any
major purchase, the relevant question is not just "how much does it
cost," but also "is it the most effective?"
But the back-and-forth over the naked dollar amounts attached
to three strikes is important for the political weight it carries, being for
most people the most readily digestible issue relating to three strikes.
After ll, who can argue with cold, hard dollar figures? This debate,
too, quickly took on a farcical quality.
Wasting no time in responding to criticism regarding three
strikes's costs, Philip Romero, Governor Wilson's chief economist, is-
sued a report in March 1994, purporting that the Statute would actu-
ally result in a savings.96 The report's conclusions were eventually
included in arguments supporting the three strikes initiative in the
California Ballot Pamphlet, which was distributed to all voters.97
In his report, for which crucial figures were obtained from a study
conducted in the early 1980s by the RAND Corporation, 98 Romero
posits the following argument: Assume that the typical inmate, before
94. See CALIFORNA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE REP. FOR
1993 CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 971, 1993-94 Regular Sess., available in LEXIS, Legis Li-
brary, Cacomm File; JUDICIARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 10-11; WAYS AND MEANS
Comm. REP., supra note 47.
95. See ASSEMBLY APPROPRIATIONS CoMM., COMMITrEE REP. FOR 1993 CAL. ASSEM-
BLY BILL No. 971, 1993-94 Regular Sess., available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cacomm File
(stating cost of three strikes will be "several billion dollars"); WAYS AND MEANS COMM.
REP., supra note 47 (estimating cost of three strikes to be in billions); GREENWOOD ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 31 (estimating three strikes will cost $5.5 billion per year for next 25
years).
96. Philip J. Romero, How Incarcerating More Felons Will Benefit California's Econ-
omy (Governor's Office of Planning and Research, Sacramento, Cal.) Mar. 31, 1994 (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Dan Morain, Wilson Advisor Says '3 Strikes'
Will Save Money, L.A. Tnms, Apr. 7, 1994, at A3.
97. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 35-37 (1994)
[hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET].
98. Romero, supra note 96, at 1.
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incarceration, committed about twenty crimes a year.99 At a cost to
society of $10,000 per crime, including medical bills, property destruc-
tion, lost earnings, and so forth, the total cost per year of the inmate's
crimes would be $200,000.1°° If, by the year 2001, three strikes results
in the incarceration of an additional 84,000 prisoners, the state's popu-
lace will have saved $16.8 billion.101 Romero compares this figure to
his estimate that, during the same period, the state will spend $2.7
billion building and operating the additional prisons needed as a result
of the Statute.'02
As pleasing as Romero's conclusions may have been to California
voters, how those conclusions were reached is questionable. While
Romero's report repeatedly bills itself as "conservative"-eight times
in seven pages-it makes some startling leaps in logic. For instance,
as an example of a cost of crime, Romero cites tourism revenues lost
as a result of the latest Los Angeles riots totalling "$2-3 billion."'1 3
But he gives no explanation of how three strikes could possibly have
either prevented the riots-which sprang from long-simmering racial
tensions 0 4-or somehow have kept the riots from exposing the racial
tensions which exist in Los Angeles and thereby damaging the city's
image as a tourism venue.
Romero's calculations on the savings that will result from the pre-
vention of crime are no less mystic. While conceding that his esti-
mates are "arbitrar[y],"'10 5 Romero plows ahead, using the figures and
reaching conclusions on just how many billions of dollars above and
beyond its costs three strikes will save California.0 6 It is not known if
Romero meant for these arbitrary figures to be among the conserva-
tive conclusions reached by his report, or if he meant for them to fall
into a separate category of "arbitrary."
But the most telling assessments of Romero's analysis come from
the authors of the very studies upon which Romero based his report.
"'I don't agree with him,'" said Peter Greenwood, author of the
RAND study.0 7 The RAND Corporation had raised objections to
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id at 4.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 2.
104. See, e.g., John L. Mitchell, Punitive Damages from Police in King Beating Rejected,
L.A. Txians, June 2, 1994, at Al (reporting that racial tensions persist long after riots).
105. Romero, supra note 96, at 3.
106. Id. at 3-5.
107. Ken Chavez, '3 Strikes' to Pare Crime Costs, Study Says, SACRAMENTo BEE, Apr. 7,
1994, at A6 (quoting Peter Greenwood).
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such use of its study earlier, during the committee approval process,
by issuing a statement to the Ways and Means Committee protesting
the" 'erroneous references to RAND data and findings.' "108 The loss
attributable to the average crime, said Greenwood, is actually $1000
to $2000-one-fifth to one-tenth the figure used by Romero10 9 The
actual cost of three strikes, according to RAND's 1994 analysis,110 is
an additional $5.5 billion per year on top of what Californians already
spend." ' Another author cited by Romero, Mark A.R. Kleiman of
Harvard, said Romero's conclusions are "'just plain wrong.' ,112
Chiming in on the debate is Franklin E. Zimring, a professor at
Boalt Hall School of Law and director of the Earl Warren Legal Insti-
tute at the University of California, Berkeley." 3 Criminals, according
to Zinring, could not have actually committed crimes of the severity
and at the rate claimed by Romero." 4 Zimring makes the observation
that, if Romero's claims were true, given the number of people incar-
cerated since 1980, "'the crime rate should be less than zero.' "115
In light of the dubious accuracy of Romero's claims, suits and
countersuits sprang up over their inclusion in the ballot pamphlet. 16
Opponents of three strikes sued to have Romero's claims stricken
from the ballot pamphlet, along with language which could lead read-
ers to believe erroneously that three strikes focused on violent
crimes.117 Supporters of three strikes countersued to exclude from the
ballot pamphlet statements that three strikes would be applicable to
both violent and nonviolent offenders, as well as references to Polly
Klaas, whose family now opposed the Statute." 8 Besieged on both
sides, the judge who heard the case played Solomon and refused to
delete any of the arguments, ordering only that some of the language
108. WAYS AND MEANS Comm. REP., supra note 47 (quoting RAND Corp.).
109. Morain, supra note 96, at A18.
110. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 33. RAND's 1994 study focuses specifically on
three strikes and is referred to as the "RAND study" in the remainder of this Comment.
111. Id. at 18. California now spends $4.5 billion on its criminal justice system. The cost
of three strikes represents a 122% increase. Id.
112. Morain, supra note 96, at A18 (quoting Mark A.R. Kleiman).
113. Vlae Kershner, '3 Strikes' Initiative on Fall Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 1994, at
A18.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Franklin E. Zimring).
116. Tupper Hull, '3 Strikes' Claim Stays in Pamphlet, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 16, 1994, at
A5.
117. Pamela J. Podger, Wording for '3 Strikes' Ironed Out, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 16, 1994,
at A3.
118. Hull, supra note 116, at A5.
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in support of the Statute be slightly toned down.'19 Both sides de-
clared victory.120 Contrary to after-the-fact spin doctoring by the pro-
three strikes camp,121 the judge never ruled on the veracity, or lack
thereof, of Romero's claims."z
But, in any discussion of the costs of three strikes, the ultimate
question is not whether three strikes is too expensive'23-the price of
safety is unquantifiable. The question, rather, is whether, relative to
what California could have had, three strikes is an effective, efficient
means of achieving the desired reduction in crime. As will be shown
in the next part of this Comment, it is neither effective nor efficient,
but is in fact counter-effective in a great many cases.
IV. TmiE STRiKEs WoRKs BACKWARDS
Three strikes purports to be aimed at stopping violent crime. In
reality it is focused on, and expends a vast portion of California's re-
sources on, nonviolent, nonserious offenders.
The Three Strikes and You're Out Committee, sponsor of the
three strikes initiative,' 24 declares:
The initiative represents the courage, determination, and as-
pirations propelling Mike Reynolds and all others who en-
deavor to strengthen society's resistance to the merciless
onslaught of brutality and violence. Violent repeat felons
bear the brunt of the blame for the deterioration in the qual-
ity of life in this state. This initiative will spearhead the as-
sault on violent crime. So much is at stake; our efforts to
regain control of our streets and neighborhoods must not
fail.
25
119. Podger, supra note 117, at A3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Curiously, in a poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times, less than half of those
surveyed expressed willingness to pay higher taxes in order to fund three strikes. Daniel
M. Weintraub, The Times Polk Residents Balk When Asked to Pay for '3 Strikes', L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1994, at Al. The survey also found that only 22% were willing to accept
cuts in funding for higher education in order to pay for three strikes. Id. at A21. Higher
education is seen as a likely loser in the three-strikes-induced budget squeeze. Three
Strikes for Higher Ed?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 21, 1994, at B12.
124. BALLOT PA wMHLET, supra note 97, at 36.
125. A Response to Murder (Three Strikes and You're Out Committee, Sacramento,
Cal.), Aug. 31, 1994 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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And in its ballot pamphlet argument: "3 Strikes keeps career
criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit
murder, behind bars where they belong."'
12 6
The reality is, over eighty percent of prosecutions under three
strikes have been for nonviolent offenses.'2 7 In over one-third of
three strikes cases, California taxpayers have been roped into footing
the bill for the long-term housing, feeding, and medical care for drug
users and petty thieves.1'
Moreover, as shown in the following sections, three strikes inex-
plicably allows for proportionately light sentences for the worst of-
fenders, while mandating shockingly harsh sentences for minor
offenses.
A. Three Strikes Is Soft on Hard Crime'29
1. Three strikes allows the worst offenders to receive
light sentences
Three strikes, while claiming to be tough on violent criminals, is
in fact considerably softer on violent felons than the rival Rainey Bill
(Rainey), 3 ° which was before the California Assembly at the same
time. 3' Three strikes allows recidivists to be released in as little as
126. BAL oT PA wPH, supra note 97, at 36.
127. For example, a study by the California Legislative Analyst discovered that, of the
2912 people convicted of second-strike offenses in California as of November 1994, 944
were serving long prison terms for either drug possession or petty theft. The number of
convictions for serious offenses and violent offenses combined reached only 17% of the
total. Gary Webb, 'Three Strikes' Law Puts Squeeze on Courts, Jails: Nonviolent Offenders
Swamp System, HoUSTON CHRON., Jan. 29, 1995, at A2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Majpap File.
As of October 23, 1994, Orange County prosecuted 94 defendants under three strikes.
Lynch, supra note 90, at A41. Of the 94, only 18 were charged with felonies involving force
or fear. The remaining 76 prosecutions concerned nonviolent crimes. Id. at A42. Of the
76 prosecutions for nonviolent crimes, 34 were for drug-related charges, 22 for burglaries,
and the rest for such crimes as petty theft, receiving stolen property, firearms possession,
and forgery. 1d. The same holds true in Los Angeles County, where fewer than one in five
three-strikes prosecutions have been for violent offenses. Colvin & Rohrlich, supra note 8,
at Al.
128. See Webb, supra note 127, at A2; Lynch, supra note 90, at A42.
129. This phraseology is owed to Marc Klaas. Brad Hayward, Panel Rejects Alternate '3
Strikes' Proposal, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 22, 1994, at A3.
130. JUDICARY COMM. RPp., supra note 53, at 9. Rainey, introduced as Assembly Bill
1568, required that the third conviction be for a violent or serious felony and, upon a third
conviction for a violent felony, prescribed a sentence of life in prison without possibility of
parole. Ld. at 9-10.
131. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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twenty-one years,132 while Rainey mandated that the incorrigibly vio-
lent spend the remainder of their lives in prison.
13 3
2. One victim is not enough for three strikes
Three strikes does not touch violent offenders who are caught for
the first time-it applies only to those who previously have been
caught and convicted.'14 Contrast this with Guaranteed Full Term
(GFT), an alternative to three strikes which was analyzed by the
RAND study.1 35 GFT provides: (1) that each person convicted of a
serious or violent felony serve a prison sentence; (2) that no credits for
good time served be granted, effectively doubling time served; 36 and
(3) that alternative sentencing be more frequently used for minor
offenses. 37
GFT would reach those perpetrators of violent or serious felonies
who are caught for the first time. Such cases constitute the majority of
felony prosecutions.1 38 By incarcerating offenders for the full term of
their sentences upon their first conviction, GFT reaches offenders at a
stage when they are most likely to repeat their offenses, and removes
felons from society during the period of their lives when they are most
active.139 By so doing, GFT would prevent a greater number of vio-
lent and serious felonies than would three strikes. 40 And because it
increases alternative sentencing for minor offenses, GFT achieves the
132. A violent felon sentenced to 25 years who earns good time credits-credits for
good behavior-of one-fifth the sentence will spend less than 21 years in jail. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(5) (limiting good time credit to one-fifth of sentence); see also
infra part VI (discussing how felons may earn good time credits of more than one-fifth of
sentence).
133. JUDICIARY COMM. EP., supra note 53, at 9.
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c).
135. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 33, at 9, 26.
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933 (West Supp. 1995) (providing sentence credits of up
to one day for each day served).
137. GREENwOOD Er AL., supra note 33, at 9.
138. "First strike" cases constituted 5738 of the 9735 cases filed by the Los Angeles
District Attorney's office between March 7 and October 20, 1994. B.J. Palermo, 'Three
Strikes' Crush Looms in L.A. Courts, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 20, 1994, at 1.
139. GREENWOOD Er AL., supra note 33, at 27-29.
140. AL at 26. The RAND study projects that GFT would prevent 4000 more violent or
serious crimes per year than would three strikes. Id.
GFr's advantage in the number of serious and violent felonies prevented is probably
much greater than the RAND study indicates, considering that the RAND study analyzes
three strikes as written. Three strikes has not been, and in all probability will never be,
implemented as written. See infra part V. The advantage of GFT is even greater consider-
ing its marginal deterrence effect. See infra part IV.B.2.a.
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decrease in felonies at about two-thirds the cost.1 41 The savings of
GFT are even greater considering that GFT, by not providing a blan-
ket imposition of life terms, will not require the people of California
to provide sustained health care to nearly as many geriatric prisoners
who are long past their crime-committing days. "'Criminals really
slow down in their mid-3s .... So these laws fill up (prison) space
with people who are not going to be much of a crime threat and leave
no room for younger guys who are more dangerous. It's like giving
Joe Montana a 20-year contract to play football.' "142
3. Three strikes decreases sentences in many second-strike cases
The Statute provides for the doubling of sentences upon a second
strike.1 43 While the doubling of sentences would appear to be a blan-
ket increase in prison terms, it actually results in decreased terms in
many cases.
Before the passage of three strikes, section 667(a) provided that
persons convicted of a serious felony who had a prior conviction for a
serious felony would have five years added to their sentences.'" For
those offenses that result in a sentence of less than five years, section
667(a) provides an enhancement which is more than twice what the
sentence would have been. In such cases, because the court may not
apply both section 667(a) and three strikes for the same offense,
145
and three strikes is to be applied "[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law,"'146 the Statute results in an enhancement which is less
than the five years that would have been added absent three strikes.1 47
And because so many of the prosecutions under three strikes are for
offenses of the type that generally result in sentences of less than five
years, 148 a considerable number of second-strike convictions will actu-
ally result in a decreased sentence.
141. GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 33, at 26.
142. Reynolds Holding, Behind the Nationwide Move to Keep Repeaters in Prison, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 8, 1993, at Al, A12 (quoting James Austin). See Boom in Elderly Inmates
Feared- 300 Percent Increase Predicted Under 'Three Strikes' Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4,
1994, at A5, for a brief discussion of the impact of the mushrooming population of elderly
prisoners that will result from three strikes.
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(1).
144. Id. § 667(a).
145. People v. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 1150, 857 P.2d 1163, 1166-67, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753,
756-57 (1993); People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112,163-64,768 P.2d 32,62-63,255 Cal. Rptr.
813, 843-44 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990).
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1).
147. See JUDICIARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 7.
148. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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4. Three strikes preempts the death penalty
Perhaps the most galling way in which three strikes is soft on hard
crime is that it preempts the death penalty for recidivists. Three
strikes's sentencing provisions are contained in subsection (c). 14 9 Par-
agraph (c)(1) provides that the sentence for a defendant with one
prior will be "twice the term otherwise provided.., for the current
felony conviction."'150 Paragraph (c)(2)(A) provides that the sentence
for a defendant with two or more priors shall be
an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater
of
(i) three times the term otherwise provided as punish-
ment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the
two or more prior felony convictions, or
(ii) twenty-five years or
(iii) the term determined by the court pursuant to Sec-
tion 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any en-
hancement applicable under Chapter 4.5 (commencing with
Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed by
Section 190 or 3046.151
The death penalty, neither a "term"'15 nor a "period,"'1 53 is con-
spicuously absent from the sentences enumerated in paragraphs (c)(1)
or (c)(2). Subsection (d) provides: "(1) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, this section shall be applied in every case in which a
defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined in this section."' 54
Since the sentencing scheme contained in subsection (c) is to be
applied in every case "notwithstanding any other provision of the
law,"'1 55 and it does not include the death penalty in its enumerated
sentences, the Statute clearly and unambiguously precludes the impo-
sition of the death penalty on recidivist felons;156 only those defend-
ants with no prior felony convictions are eligible for the death penalty.
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(1).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
152. A "term" is "[a] fixed and definite period of time; implying a period of time with
some definite termination. Period of determined or prescribed duration. A specified pe-
riod of time." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
153. A "period" is "[a]ny point, space, or division of time." L at 1138.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1).
155. Id.
156. See JUDICiARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 8.
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And, as the Statute requires prosecutors to plead and prove all pri-
ors,157 the death penalty is effectively eliminated for recidivists.
Was this the intent of the legislature? We presume the legislature
to mean what it says; 158 only when it is unclear what the legislature is
saying do we consider legislative intent. 9 It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction, expressed repeatedly and adamantly in case
law, that" '[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need
for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of
the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of
a provision adopted by the voters).' "160
Even if this long-standing rule of statutory interpretation were
tossed aside, and legislative intent were examined, the Statute's prohi-
bition of the death penalty for recidivists may still survive. The legis-
lature declared that, in passing three strikes, it was its intent "to
ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment.'1 61 While the
death penalty would qualify as "greater punishment," it would be con-
trary to the desire for longer prison sentences-it shortens time of
imprisonment.
In fact, there is evidence that the legislature affirmatively in-
tended to eliminate the death penalty for recidivists. The Statute was
passed overwhelmingly despite the warning from the Senate Commit-
tee on Judiciary, three months before the Statute's passage, that,
"[s]ince death is not a 'term', it apparently is not an option." 6
The courts may be similarly disposed in interpreting the Statute.
As the California Supreme Court recently stated, "[w]e recognize that
in the construction of penal statutes, we must give the benefit of any
doubt to the criminal defendant."'
63
To complete three strikes's preemption of the death penalty, it is
likely that, if three strikes is to be implemented as written, even first-
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1).
158. People v. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 1146,857 P.2d 1163,1164,22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753,754
(citing Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 798, 789 P.2d 934, 940, 268 Cal. Rptr.
753, 759 (1990) (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 303-04,
248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988))). "If no ambiguity, uncertainty, or doubt about the mean-
ing of a statute appears, the provision is to be applied according to its terms without fur-
ther judicial construction." People v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 486, 488, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 61, 62-63 (1984).
159. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1146, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
160. Id. (quoting Delaney,.50 Cal. 3d at 798, 789 P.2d at 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 759).
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
162. JUDICI.ry Comm. RE'., supra note 53, at 8.
163. People v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 63 (citation
omitted).
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time offenders will be exempted from the imposition of the death pen-
alty. The Statute creates two classes in its application of the death
penalty: those who have priors, and those who have no priors. As the
right to one's life is fundamental,"6 the discriminatory imposition of
the death penalty would be subject to strict scrutiny: The state would
have to demonstrate that the discrimination is necessary to advance a
compelling state interest. 165 But the imposition of capital punishment
on only the less culpable would certainly fail even a rational basis re-
view. 166 It would fly in the face of rationality-not to mention all no-
tions of fairness-to impose greater punishment on the less culpable,
and lesser punishment on the more culpable.
There is, however, one way in which the death penalty theoreti-
cally may be imposed on those with prior convictions. To retain the
possibility of imposing the death penalty on a recidivist, the prosecu-
tor may move the court to strike the priors. 67 But requiring the pros-
ecutor to first plead and prove the priors, 68 and then immediately
move to strike those priors would not only force the prosecutor into a
pointless charade, it would effectively negate prior convictions as an
aggravating factor in considering whether to impose the death pen-
alty. Further, the option of striking priors is available more in theory
than in practice.169
B. Three Strikes Is Hard on Soft Crime
Supporters of three strikes remind us that avoidance of three
strikes sentencing is easy: To avoid harsh punishment, simply refrain
from breaking the law.170 The goal, says Bill Jones, quick at the ready
with a mantra for the masses, is "zero tolerance" of crime.
171
But when Jones and his fellow three strikes supporters proclaim
"zero tolerance" of crime, how far are they willing to go to carry it
out? For example, a sure and easy way to stop illegal parking would
be to prescribe a sentence of life imprisonment for parking viola-
164. People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236,251,551 P.2d 375,384, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55,64 (1976)
(noting that life is most fundamental right).
165. I& at 243, 551 P.2d at 379, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
166. Rational basis review merely requires that a statute be rationally related to its pur-
poses. See In re Kapperman, 11 Cal. 3d 542, 545, 522 P.2d 657, 659, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99
(1974).
167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2).
168. Id. § 1170.12(d)(1).
169. See infra part IV.C.
170. Bill Jones, '3 Strikes' Debate Is About Ideology, Not Public Finance, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 29, 1994, at B9.
171. Id.
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tions.172 What causes us to dismiss this proposal as absurd is our in-
nate sense of proportionality between crime and punishment.
While it is clear that there are punishments that are proportion-
ate, and punishments that are not, the line between the two has been
difficult to ascertain with any precision. 173 This section provides indi-
cations that, wherever the line may lie, the Statute imposes punish-
ments which fall well on the wrong side.
Three strikes's disproportionality stems from the fact that the
Statute does not require the current conviction to be for a serious or
violent felony-it may be for an act such as stealing a slice of pizza or
picking a pocket. 74 The disproportionality is magnified by the fact
that the prior convictions are not limited to violent felonies.175 The
California Senate Committee on Judiciary observed that "[a]ny third
felony.., would result in a life term under the provisions of this bill,
regardless of whether or not [the defendant] had ever acted violently
or dangerously.' 76 The result is possible imprisonment for life for
mere petty offenses-a penalty grotesquely out of proportion to the
axiomatic "eye for an eye."
As demonstrated in the following, this possibility has become
more than mere hypothetical.
1. Examples of disproportionality
a. three strikes nails a pizza thief
Jerry Williams has a history of petty crime and an almost comical
propensity for getting caught. 77 His first conviction, for drug posses-
sion, came at age nineteen. He was sentenced to three years' proba-
tion.178 Next, Williams was convicted for assaulting a man and taking
the man's wallet during a dispute over a drug sale. 79 In 1989 he pled
172. This outlandish example is not original to me-the U.S. Supreme Court used it as
an illustration of a sentence so disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed that
it may implicate Eighth Amendment protections. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274
n.11 (1980).
173. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-90 (1991) ("[T]he standards seem so
inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of sub-
jective values.").
174. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1170.12(a).
175. See iii
176. JuDIcIARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 4.
177. Gordon Dillow, Pizza Case Unlikely Focus of '3 Strikes' Debate, L.A. TMES, Sept.
18, 1994, at Bi.
178. IS at B5.
179. Id
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guilty to joyriding.180 His most recent prior came when he tried to
snatch a gold chain off a man's neck-a robbery he attempted right in
front of a police sergeant.' 81 On July 30, 1994, Williams took a slice of
pizza from a group of four children."8 He has been convicted of fel-
ony petty theft'8 3 and now faces life in prison for stealing that single
slice of pizza. 84
b. three strikes puts a wallet-grabber away-maybe forever
Steven Gordon grew up in a middle-class family, the son of an
Air Force master sergeant. 8 He competed on the varsity football,
basketball, and track teams while attending high school at Travis Air
Force Base.'86 After graduation, Gordon went to work for the Ameri-
can Home Food Products cannery, where he was employed for six
years. 87 While working there, he made regular contributions to his
401k retirement plan and a Christmas Club savings account.
188
Steve Gordon's middle-class world disintegrated in 1985 when he
was fired from his job for drug use; he soon found himself not only
jobless, but homeless as well. 189 Gordon's two priors resulted from
stealing $200 from the cash register of a Kentucky Fried Chicken and
snatching a purse.' 90 On March 8, 1994, less than twenty-four hours
after Governor Wilson signed three strikes into law, Gordon made a
grab for the wallet of Karl Alexander, a Sacramento room-service
waiter.' 9' Alexander chased Gordon down and pinned him to the
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. As it turns out, Williams had to throw the slice of pizza away, since it contained
pork, to which Williams is allergic. Id.
183. Eric Slater, Man Guilty in Potential '3 Strikes' Pizza Case, L.A. TIns, Jan. 21,
1995, at B1.
184. Id.
185. Peter Hecht, '3 Strikes' Cases Draw Early Cries of Injustice, S.F. EXAMINER, June
12, 1994, at Bll.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. I.
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ground until police arrived.192 Gordon now faces the possibility of life
in prison.
193
2. Indications of disproportionality
a. an objective indication of disproportionality: three strikes defeats
marginal deterrence
Under prior law, an offender's sentence would be ratcheted
upwards commensurate with the seriousness and number of offenses
committed.194 As such, offenders were given an incentive to limit
their acts to the least harmful and the fewest violations by which they
could achieve their ultimate aims. For recidivists, however, three
strikes has lifted this scheme of marginal deterrence. 195
This deterrence-removing effect is present to some degree in all
mandatory enhancements. But it is greatly magnified in the case of
three strikes because, for purposes of the current conviction, it treats
all felonies, serious and nonserious, violent and nonviolent, the
same.19 6 Three strikes, therefore, reduces the deterrence that would
keep an offender from escalating a nonserious, nonviolent felony into
a serious or violent one, or perhaps committing additional crimes.
192. 1&
193. For more examples of harsh sentences for minor offenses, see Nicholas Riccardi,
Proposition 184: Nonviolent 'Three-Strike' Crimes Detailed, L.A. Tnims, Oct. 19, 1994, at
A22.
Washington state, which passed its own three strikes law in November 1993, Thaai
Walker, Police Concerned About Effect of '3 Strikes' Law, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1994, at
A15, has seen similar cases. One example is Larry Fisher, who was convicted of stealing
$390 from his grandfather and robbing a pizza parlor of $100 by sticking his finger in his
coat pocket to simulate a gun. John Balzar, The Target" Repeat Offenders, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1994, at A5. He was arrested in April 1994 for taking $151 from a sandwich shop,
once again using the finger-in-the-pocket method. Id.
While it is true that cases of such gross disproportionality are among the minority of
three strikes prosecutions, they are no less unjust for being so. In a nation built of individ-
uals, injustice cannot be made just by saying it snares only the few-"[f]or one man ought
never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another." IMMAN-
UEL KANT, THE PmLOsOPIy OF LAW (W. Hastie trans., 1887), quoted in SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs Piocnssns 137 (5th ed.
1989).
194. See JUDIciARY COMm. REP., supra note 53, at 4 ("Existing law differentiates be-
tween crimes. Thus, some felony offenses, such as rape or murder, have higher penalties
than others, such as theft.").
195. See id. ("[T]his bill would make no distinction in severity between different
felonies.").
196. If three strikes focused only on violent offenders, marginal deterrence would be a
lesser issue: The target offender would already have a propensity for violence, despite the
marginal deterrence under the old law.
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Consider the following scenario. During a burglary, the burglar
finds the occupant of the dwelling present. Without three strikes, the
prospect of substantially increased prison time may deter the burglar
from attacking the occupant. But under three strikes, the burglar who
has two priors is already subject to a sentence of twenty-five years to
life regardless of whether he commits a further crime. So long as
triple the cumulative sentence for the combined crimes would not ex-
ceed twenty-five years, three strikes imposes no penalty on the burglar
for attacking the occupant.
In fact, because the average murderer in California is sentenced
to less than eight-and-a-half years in prison, 97 the burglar may simply
decide to kill the occupant, and thereby eliminate a potential witness.
If the burglar is caught and convicted, three strikes may ensure that
the murder will cost him nothing.
Furthermore, the offender will have less to lose in evading or
even attacking police who attempt to arrest him or her.198 There al-
ready have been reports from San Francisco area police that, because
of three strikes, felons are now resisting arrest more violently.199
While it may be true that a potentially greater punishment will
deter some offenders from committing any further crimes at all, reli-
ance on the complete deterrence rationale fails to account for those
who commit offenses in order to fuel drug addictions. Drug addicts
who are compelled by their addictions to commit a crime are no
longer deterred from turning their crimes of burglary or theft into as-
sault, mayhem, or even murder.
Contrast this again with the effects of GFT.2 °0 In its analysis-
which considered only the incapacitative201 effect, and not the deter-
rent effect of three strikes and of GFT-RAND determined that GFT
would slightly exceed three strikes in the number of crimes pre-
197. The average murderer in California spends 4.2 years in prison. GREENWOOD ET
A.., supra note 33, at 58. Felons serve at least half of their sentences. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 2930-2933.6 (West Supp. 1995). Therefore, the average sentence for murder is
less than 8.4 years.
198. See Walker, supra note 193, at A15; Dan Walters, While Politicians Run with
"Three Strikes," Law Enforcement Frets, L.A. DAmLY J., June 14, 1994, at 6.
199. Walker, supra note 193, at A15. Seattle area police have also reported that, due to
Washington state's three strikes law, suspects there are now resisting arrest with greater
force. Balzar, supra note 193, at A5.
200. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
201. GREEmVOOD ET Ai., supra note 33, at 20. "Incapacitation" is used in this Com-
ment to refer to the effect incarceration has of removing an offender from society at large,
thereby denying that offender the capacity to perpetrate further offenses upon the public.
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vented.2°2 But if we consider deterrent effect, the advantages of GFT
become all the more pronounced. Because GFT retains greater flexi-
bility for the courts to impose increased prison time for additional or
more serious crimes, it results in a stronger marginal deterrent effect.
Finally, GFT arguably has a greater total deterrent effect because it
reaches first-time offenders, deterring those who have not had a
chance to become habitual offenders.
b. case law indications of disproportionality
Proportionality has been viewed as an implicit component of the
protection against cruel and unusual punishments. °3 Although the
U.S. Supreme Court's affinity for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment encompasses a requirement of proportionality has waxed
and waned in the past decade and a half,2°4 the California Supreme
Court has consistently held that California's Constitution does require
proportionality between sentence and offense.
205
202. Id at 26.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 17; see also Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (discussing Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement).
204. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Court, while recognizing the possi-
bility of an Eighth Amendment violation in a case of extreme disproportionality, said that
it would defer to legislatures in matters of sentencing. Id at 274 n.11.
The concept of proportionality garnered a stronger endorsement in Solem, 463 U.S. at
290-92, with the Court not only reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment requires propor-
tionality, but setting forth a three-factor test for its determination. Id. The three factors to
be considered in determining Eighth Amendment proportionality were: (1) the gravity of
the offense relative to the severity of punishment; (2) comparison to punishments in other
jurisdictions for similar offenses; and (3) comparison to punishments for other offenses in
the same jurisdiction. Id.
The pendulum swung once again, albeit not completely, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957 (1991). In Harmelin, a defendant brought an Eighth Amendment challenge to his
sentence of life imprisonment for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Id. at 961. Two
Justices, Scalia and Rehnquist, held that the Eighth Amendment has not historically and
therefore does not now require proportionality between sentence and offense. Id. at 965.
The four dissenters, White, Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall, applied a proportionality
analysis to the case. I&a at 1009-28. The issue is controlled, therefore, by Justices Kennedy,
O'Conner, and Souter, who concurred in Harmelin. The concurring Justices opined that
proportionality analysis should be employed only in the most extreme cases, and Harme-
lin's case was not sufficiently extreme. Id at 997-1004; see also McCullough v. Singletary,
967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1423 (1993) (discussing state of
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis after Harmelin); Kathleen Vandy, Casenote,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 883 (1993) (reviewing post-Harmelin Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis).
205. The California Constitution provides that "[c]ruel or unusual punishment may not
be inflicted." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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California's requirement of proportionality is spelled out -in Peo-
ple v. Dillon,20 6 in which the California Supreme Court held that a
sentence would violate Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitu-
tion if it was "grossly" disproportionate.20 7
The Dillon court gave some examples of sentences that had been
rejected for disproportionality, °8 including: an indeterminate life sen-
tence for a second conviction for indecent exposure;20 9 a bar on recidi-
vist narcotics offenders from being considered for parole for ten
years;210 twenty-two years for nonviolent child molestation;2 1 and the
requirement that persons convicted of misdemeanor public lewdness
register with the police as sex offenders.212
All of these sentences have been adjudged unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate. And yet, none seem nearly so harsh as a life sentence
for stealing a slice of pizza, even considering priors of drug possession,
stealing a wallet, joyriding, and attempting to steal a gold chain.213
Nor do the court's examples approach the severity of a life sentence
for stealing a wallet, despite priors of stealing $200 and snatching a
purse.21 4
And since the Statute requires the prosecutor to plead and prove
all priors, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported that "this
[statute] appears to be constitutionally infirm in that it would require
cruel and unusual punishment in some cases, with no option for a
lesser sentence in the interest of justice.
21 5
Even so, Jerry Williams and Steven Gordon will face stiff uphill
battles should they bring a proportionality challenge against the Stat-
206. 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
207. Id at 450, 668 P.2d at 700, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court prescribed two factors
for the determination of proportionality: the nature of the offense and the nature of the
offender. Id. at 479, 668 P.2d at 720, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The analysis is to be conducted
with particular regard to the degree of danger the offense and the offender present to
society. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1994) ("The Legislature finds
and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. This purpose is
best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense ....").
208. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 478-79, 668 P.2d at 719-20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
209. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 429-32, 503 P.2d 921, 933-36, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 229-32
(1972).
210. In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 5-18, 553 P.2d 590, 592-602, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 432-42
(1976); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 917-29, 519 P.2d 1073, 1076-85,112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652-61
(1974).
211. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 653-56, 537 P.2d 384, 394-97, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552,
562-65 (1975).
212. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).
213. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
215. JuDicLkRy Com. REP., supra note 53, at 8.
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ute as applied to them. Since the California Supreme Court handed
down Dillon in 1983, there has been but one California case uncov-
ered by research for this Comment, People v. Beheler,216 in which a
sentence may have been vacated under a Dillon analysis. In a deci-
sion the precise basis of which was unclear, a court of appeal reduced
Beheler's conviction for first-degree felony murder to one for volun-
tary manslaughter. 17 The California Supreme Court declined to hear
the case and ordered the opinion depublished. 21 1 Dillon, it seems,
may have been the last hurrah for proportionality in California
courts. 219 The concept of proportionality, however, exists independ-
ent of judicial inclinations.
216. 153 Cal. App. 3d 242, 200 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1984) (depublished upon denial of hear-
ing (May 17, 1984)).
217. Beheler had been in the back seat of a car. Id., 200 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98 (opinion
has been deleted from official reporter). The robbery of a pedestrian was being committed
from the front seat of the car, in the course of which the victim was killed. Id. at 196-98.
Earlier that night, Beheler had discussed the robbery with the active participants, but when
the plan was set to motion, Beheler was too drunk to take an active role. Id. Beheler's
companions did not know whether he was awake at the time of the robbery. Id.
The court in Dillon, in addition to its proportionality analysis, had engaged in a discus-
sion of the felony-murder law in California, noting that it created a loophole permitting
prosecutors to obtain convictions for first-degree murder without having to prove intent or
even malice. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472-76, 668 P.2d at 715-18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408-11. The
court concluded that the existence of this loophole "leaves much to be desired," id. at 472
n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19, and urged the legislature to give the
subject a thorough reconsideration. Id The reasons for the Dillon court's dismay at the
results produced by the felony-murder law are closely tied to notions of proportionality.
The Beheler court cited and discussed Dillon as authority for reducing Beheler's sen-
tence but failed to state precisely which rationale it was borrowing from Dillon. See
Beheler, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 206 ("[The rationale behind the Dillon opinion.., is to stress
the importance of individual accountability and proportionate punishment."). It is not
clear whether the Beheler court based its ruling on the Dillon court's proportionality analy-
sis or its statements on felony-murder.
218. The order to depublish was not published.
219. Moreover, art. I, § 24 of the California Constitution, adopted prior to Dillon, limits
the protection provided by art. I, § 17 against cruel or unusual punishment to no more than
those afforded by the federal Constitution. CAL.. CoNs. art. I, § 24. As discussed earlier,
the federal Constitution presently affords little protection in terms of proportionality. See
supra note 204 and accompanying text.
On its face, Article I, Section 17 of California's constitution forbids the infliction of
punishment that is either cruel or unusual, as compared to the federal Constitution's prohi-
bition on punishments that are both cruel and unusual. Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17
with U.S. CoNsr. amend VIII. Whether the limit imposed by § 24 applies to the definitions
of "cruel" and "unusual" as separate concepts or as one single concept is a constitutional
curiosity brought into sharp focus by Justice Scalia's observation in Harmelin that harsh
sentences may be cruel, but not unusual in a constitutional sense. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
967.
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c. subjective indications of disproportionality
Judges, juries, and victims each play an indispensable role in a
criminal prosecution. As such, they are in a position to serve as the
conscience of that prosecution.
i. judges
Given the often shocking results produced by the Statute, it is no
surprise that many California judges-eighty-five percent of whom
were appointed by conservative Republican governors22 0-are refus-
ing to apply three strikes when it leads to disproportionate sentencing.
One such individual is Superior Court Judge Lawrence Antolini of
Sonoma County, who is known as a law-and-order conservative.221
The defendant, Jeffrey Missamore, had incurred his second strike for
possession of two marijuana cigarettes while in a county honor farm,
where he was serving time for shoplifting twelve dollars' worth of
food. 2 2 His first strike had come ten years earlier when he was con-
victed of residential burglary for taking his roommate's VCR.223 Ab-
sent the previous conviction, Missamore's sentence would have been
two to four years; but with the prior, he faced up to eight years. 2
Judge Antolini, in declaring his refusal to sentence Missamore by
three strikes, said, "'This man is not a threat to anyone, and to send
him away like the law requires would be insane.' 22
Other judges have taken a less confrontational stance, withhold-
ing comment on three strikes's sanity but circumventing the Statute by
220. Reuben, supra note 270, at 17.
221. Jenifer Warren, Judge Says He'll Defy '3 Strikes' Sentencing Law, L.A. TIMEs, July
22, 1994, at Al.
222. Id. at A23.
223. IM.
224. Id. Just what sentence three strikes provides for defendants like Jeffrey Missamore
is unclear. Generally, there are three sentences available for each offense. JUDICIARY
Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 6-7. In addition to the "midterm," or presumed sentence,
the judge may apply a prespecified longer term or a prespecified shorter term. Id. at 7.
The Statute is ambiguous as to which of these terms paragraph (c)(1) refers to as "the term
otherwise provided." Id. at 6 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(1)).
Furthermore, it is not known whether the doubling of the terms under paragraph
(c)(1) should take place before applicable other enhancements are added, or after. Id. at 7.
"These ambiguities are repeated," id., in paragraph (c)(2)(A)(i), which provides for
the tripling of terms for defendants with two prior strikes, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i).
225. Warren, supra note 221, at A23. At the time of this writing, an appellate court had
affirmed Judge Antolini's sentencing and the State had filed a petition with the California
Supreme Court. William Claiborne, Tough Sentencing Law Sparks Legal Debate, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 31, 1994, at A3.
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either striking prior convictions or reducing the current conviction
from a felony to a misdemeanor. 26 For example, in July 1994, Sacra-
mento Superior Court Judge Peter Smith decided to treat a prior New
York felony conviction as a misdemeanor in order to avoid sentencing
a defendant under three strikes.2 27 Cases of judges ignoring priors,
while not uncommon, are the subject of ongoing controversy: As of
January 18, 1994, there were twenty-nine such cases on appeal in San
Diego County alone."2
ii. juries
As three strikes's disproportionate effects become more publi-
cized, and as jurors become more keenly aware of their role in impos-
ing the harsh sentences, we may see cases of jury nullification of three
strikes sentencing. As Los Angeles County district attorney Gil
Garcetti put it, "'[w]e're going to have a tremendous jury backlash.
Jurors are going to require more proof than [the current standard of]
"beyond reasonable doubt."' 229
Jury nullification for sentence disproportionality is particularly ef-
fective in three strikes cases. It relieves jurors of having to contem-
plate the release-or-punish-unfairly dilemma by giving them a choice
as to degree of nullification. Since the existence of prior convictions
involves questions of fact, the defendant has a right to a jury determi-
nation on the question.230 The jury may then nullify just that portion
of the penalty it finds unfair. For example, if the prosecution presents
evidence of two priors, the jury may find that the prosecution has
proved only one, or none, to their satisfaction, depending on the sen-
tence they feel is appropriate.
But as fortuitous as all this may be, three strikes still forces juries
in such cases to make sham findings in order to achieve justice.
226. See Warren, supra note 221, at Al; Judges Who Insist on True Justice, L.A. TIMES,
July 23, 1994, at B17.
227. Another Judge Says No, SACmmENTo BEE, July 26, 1994, at B6.
228. Tony Perry, Ruling a Victory for 'Three Strikes' Law's Advocates, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1995, at A3. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of courts' limited discretion in striking
priors.
229. Morain, supra note 7, at A3 (second alteration in original) (quoting Los Angeles
County district attorney Gil Garcetti).
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985); People v. Calderon, 9 Cal. 4th 69, 73, 885
P.2d 83, 87, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 337 (1994).
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iii. victims
Some victims have expressed ambivalence and even outright op-
position to the shocking results the Statute has produced. For exam-
ple, in the case of Steven Gordon,231 his victim, Karl Alexander,
wanted Gordon punished for the attempt on his wallet, but did not
feel Gordon should spend the remainder of his life in prison.2
3
2
Another such victim was Joan Miller, a seventy-year-old Sacra-
mento resident.233 Miller did not want to see a man who stole a box of
old clothes from her car go to prison for the rest of his life; she refused
to testify against him at the risk of being imprisoned herself for con-
tempt of court- 4 "'Of course, he should [be] punished,'" Miller
said, "'but life in prison for stealing my boxes of old clothes is really
ridiculous.' "235 The defendant ultimately pleaded to a lesser
charge.36 Mike Reynolds's reaction to Miller's refusal to testify was
that Miller was "'just condemning another victim.' "37
While Miller may or may not have been willing to condemn an-
other victim to the loss of a box of old clothes, Marc and Joe Klaas
cannot shrug off their loss so easily. The father and grandfather of
Polly Klaas, the murder victim whose death provided three strikes
with the kind of publicity no amount of lobbying could, initially sup-
ported Reynolds's law.- 8 But they have since changed their minds.239
The Statute, they have said, is unaffordable, too harsh on petty
criminals, and too lenient on the truly violent.240 The Klaas's instead
gave their support to Assembly'member Richard Rainey's alternative
bill.2
41
Dennis Lees, who, like Mike Reynolds and Marc Klaas, had a
daughter who was murdered by a repeat offender, has also expressed
his opposition to California's three strikes law. "Where is our com-
231. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
232. Hecht, supra note 185, at Bli.
233. Victim Prevents Felon from Taking 3rd Strike Under Law, Q-H. Tim., May 1, 1994,
at 12.
234. Three-Strike Travesty, S.F. Ci-mo., May 2, 1994, at A20.
235. Jim Herron Zamora, City Burglary Victim Leads Fight Against '3 Strikes', S.F. Ex-
AMINER, Aug. 14, 1994, at C1 (quoting Joan Miller).
236. Three-Strike Travesty, supra note 234.
237. Peter Hecht, '3 Strikes' Fight Rages Inside, Outside Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug.
16, 1994, at B1 (quoting Mike Reynolds).
238. Ingram, supra note 68, at A29.
239. Vlae Kershner, Klaases Like Substitute 3 Strikes Bill, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 10, 1994, at
A17.
240. Id.
241. Id
April 1995] 1077
1078 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
mon sense?" 2 he asks. "[W]e can't afford scatter-gun solutions when
more carefully crafted, affordable approaches will be much more
effective[.]
' 2 43
Understandably, Reynolds takes a dim view of this opposition to
his law from the individuals expected to support him most. The
Klaas's, he conjectures, may have parted ways with him because they
"'felt that their daughter was so important that they should go out on
their own.' "244 As for Miller, according to Rod Rimmer of the Three
Strikes and You're Out Initiative, her reason for refusing to testify was
born not of compassion, but from the fact that, at the time, her son
was also awaiting trial in a three strikes case.2 45
C. Phantom Prosecutorial Discretion
Three strikes's supporters answer charges of disproportionality
by pointing out that paragraph (d)(2) of the Statute24 6 gives prosecu-
tors discretion to move to strike a prior in the furtherance of justice,
and a just outcome may thus be achieved.24 However, any attempts
by prosecutors to further justice through the striking of priors will be
stymied by the language contained in the second sentence of para-
graph (d)(2), which inexplicably provides that the court may only
grant such motions upon its satisfaction "that there is insufficient evi-
dence to prove the prior felony conviction."''2m Thus, while the prose-
cutor may move to strike priors in order to achieve a just and
proportionate sentence, the court is restricted to striking only those
priors for which the prosecutor has insufficient evidence. But why
would the prosecutor move to strike the priors if they could not be
proven in the first place?
242. Dennis Lees, The 'Three Strike' Fallacy, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1994, at 9A.
243. Id.
244. Bill Ainsworth, 'Three Strikes' Spokesman Has Change of Heart, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 7.
245. Telephone Interview with Rod Rimmer, supra note 44. No independent support
for this assertion has been found.
246. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2).
247. Morain, supra note 7, at A3. The three strikes bill passed by the legislature pro-
vided that the prosecutor may move to dismiss or strike a prior "pursuant to Section 1385."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(0(2) (West Supp. 1995). However, because § 1385 explicitly pro-
hibits its use for the striking of priors for the purposes of sentencing under § 667, the judge
would be unable to grant any such motion. Id The three strikes initiative, the version now
in effect, cures this problem by placing the Statute in newly created section 1170.12. Id.
§ 1170.12.
248. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2).
[Vol. 28:1047
A TALE OF THREE STRIKES
Further, prosecutorial discretion has proven to be a poor safe-
guard against disproportionate sentencing as it is against the prosecu-
tor's interest to make motions to strike priors. Given the tougher-
than-thou contest among legislators sparked by the three strikes
bill,2 49 one wonders how willing district attorneys are to establish a
record of failing to apply three strikes at every opportunity.5 0 More-
over, if a district attorney decides not to apply three strikes against a
particular defendant, and that defendant were to commit a violent
crime upon his or her release, an angry public would surely require a
strong, perhaps impossible, justification for the district attorney's
decision.
The pressure on district attorneys is heightened by the fact that
the Statute appears to require them to plead and prove priors regard-
less of whether they intend to immediately turn around and move the
court to strike them."s By requiring that the priors be pleaded and
proved, the Statute forecloses any attempts by the prosecutor to ob-
tain a proportionate sentence by ignoring the priors and hoping that
no one will notice. Three strikes requires that the record reflect the
defendant's priors, as well as the prosecutor's motion to strike.252 The
public is thus given a means by which to track prosecutors' implemen-
tation of the three strikes law, thereby turning the screws of public
pressure once again.
Given these conflicting motivations of fairness versus political
survival, district attorneys have been split into two camps: those who
will prosecute each and every eligible case under three strikes, and
those who will use three strikes only against defendants whom they
deem deserving of the sentencing enhancement.253 The predictable
effect has been that an offense that brings a sentence of a year or two
in one county will result in a sentence of twenty-five years to life in
another.5 4
249. See Bailey, supra note 55, at A3.
250. For a period of time after the three strikes bill's passage, Los Angeles County dis-
trict attorney Gil Garcetti instructed all deputy district attorneys working under him to
prosecute all "wobblers" as felonies. Martin Berg, D.A.'s Office Softens Stance on '3
Strikes', L.A. DAILY J., May 6, 1994, at 1. Wobblers are offenses that may be prosecuted as
either felonies or misdemeanors. Id.
251. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2).
252. Id
253. See Chiang, supra note 3, at Al, A8; Peter Hecht, How 'Three Strikes' Law Is Used
Across the State, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 8, 1994, at A7.
254. Chiang, supra note 3, at Al, A8. Such disparity in sentencing is in direct contra-
vention of legislative intent as stated in California Penal Code § 1170(a)(1):
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I earlier wrote that the Statute "appears" to require the prosecu-
tor to plead and prove priors because, once again, the wording of the
Statute is puzzling. Paragraph (d)(1) provides: "The prosecuting at-
torney shall plead and prove each prior felony conviction except as
provided in paragraph (2). '' 255 This paragraph is a directive to prose-
cutors to plead and prove all priors, "except as provided in paragraph
(2)." The use of the word "except" leads one to expect that paragraph
(d)(2) will describe circumstances under which the prosecutor would
not be required to plead and prove priors.
So what does paragraph (d)(2) provide as an exception to the
requirement that the prosecutor plead and prove all priors? Does it
name, as logic might otherwise dictate, Penal Code section 1025,
which provides that, upon defendant's admission of the priors, they
may be noted in the minutes without further proof?256 Or does it
name, as unlikely and incorrect as it would be, Evidence Code section
452, providing that the court may take notice of court records?257
No, rather than either of these possibilities, paragraph (d)(2) of-
fers an impossibility. It merely provides that the prosecutor may
move the court to strike the priors.258 But this is an exception from
the requirement that the prosecutor plead and prove all priors. If the
prosecutor did not plead and prove the priors in the first place, how
can the prosecutor move to strike priors which, as far as the court is
concerned, do not exist? Paragraph (d)(2) would have made sense if
it had either named section 1025, or provided an exception where the
prosecutor intended to move to strike priors.
There is a further absurdity to paragraph (d)(2). Since three
strikes is to be applied "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law," 9 it overrides the provisions of Penal Code section 1025.260 IS
the prosecutor now required to attempt to plead and prove priors
The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is
punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the serious-
ness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders corn-
mitting the same offense under similar circumstances. The Legislature further finds
and declares that the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of
sentences can best be achieved by determinate sentences ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
255. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(1).
256. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985).
257. CAL. EviD. CODE § 452(d) (West 1985). Since Penal Code § 1025 applies specifi-
cally to such situations, Evidence Code § 452 does not apply.
258. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(d)(2).
259. Id. § 1170.12(a).
260. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025.
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even when the defendant admits them? Read literally, that is exactly
what paragraph (d)(2) requires.
V. THE CRimiNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM LACKS THE RESOURCES
NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THREE STRIKES FULLY
Three strikes's enormously broad coverage261 will make full im-
plementation all but impossible since the courts and prosecutors sim-
ply do not have the necessary resources. Plea bargaining is a tool used
to obtain convictions in routine cases quickly, thereby allowing prose-
cutors the time needed to prosecute serious or complex crimes.2 62 But
if the defendant knows that a third felony conviction will result in a
life sentence, he will have nothing to lose and perhaps much to gain by
going to trial. By removing the incentive to plea bargain, the Statute
has resulted in a burgeoning increase in the number of criminal tri-
als.2 63 Before three strikes, ninety-four percent of all felony cases in
California were settled through plea bargaining.21 After three
strikes, only six percent of third-strike cases and fourteen percent of
second-strike cases have been settled by plea bargaining.2 65
In order to free staff to work on the additional trials resulting
from three strikes, Los Angeles County district attorney Gil Garcetti
has stopped filing worker safety, environmental, and major fraud
261. Between March 7, 1994, when three strikes went into effect, and October 20, 1994,
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office filed 9735 cases. Palermo, supra note
138, at 1. Of those prosecutions, 2898 allege that the defendant committed a second felony,
and 1099 were for third strikes. Id
The Statute is so far-reaching, in fact, that even the legislators who voted overwhelm-
ingly in its favor are having to resort to extraordinary measures in attempting to work
around it. Eric Bailey, Legislature Urged to Not Boost Felonies, L.A. Tirams, Apr. 20, 1994,
at A3. Many proposals to elevate particular misdemeanors to felonies have been altered
or shot down entirely upon contemplation of sending people away for life for such crimes
as abalone poaching, id., or possession of a bear gall bladder, Hallye Jordan, Senate Leader
to Block Creation of New Felonies, L.A. DALy J., Apr. 20,1994, at 3. State Senator Quen-
tin Kopp, who introduced a bill to make assault with a vehicle a felony, was forced to
amend it to provide that a conviction under his bill would not count as a conviction under
three strikes. ld. Greg Totten of the California District Attorney's Association argued
that any such provisions placed in bills passed before the passage of the three strikes initia-
tive became void upon passage of the three strikes initiative. Id. The legislature would
then be required to produce a two-thirds vote in order to amend or repeal the statute. Id.
"'[Y]ou can't write around laws in advance [of their passage],'" said Bill Lockyer, Senate
president pro tempore. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Bill Lockyer). Lockyer
recommended that lawmakers forego their election-year ritual of introducing bills to ele-
vate minor crimes to felonies. Bailey, supra, at A28.
262. Webb, supra note 127, at A2.
263. Morain, supra note 62, at A15.
264. Webb, supra note 127, at A2 (citing California Legislative Analyst).
265. Id. (citing California Legislative Analyst).
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prosecutions.266 San Mateo County district attorney Jim Fox has said
that he will require more than twice as many attorneys to handle the
additional jury trials.267 Already, county jails have become so packed
with three strikes defendants awaiting trial that some counties have
had to release convicts early or refuse to accept new ones.268 San Ber-
nardino County jail has stopped taking persons booked for misde-
meanors.269 Los Angeles County sheriff Sherman Block has reported
that he may have to release more dangerous inmates early to make
room for three strikes defendants who are awaiting trial.27 °
The effect on the judiciary has been no less overwhelming. As
criminal cases have priority over civil cases,271 Garcetti has predicted
that the Statute will crowd the courts with so many criminal cases that
civil cases will eventually be squeezed out.272 Said Fox, "'the civil
system as we know it will no longer exist.' "273 In October 1994, Judge
Cecil Mills, supervising judge of the Los Angeles criminal courts, pre-
dicted that more than half of all downtown Los Angeles civil courts
will have been closed down by December to make room for the addi-
tional criminal trials resulting from three strikes.274 By Christmas
twenty-three of the forty civil courts had been closed.275 Long Beach
Superior Court had stopped hearing civil trials altogether, with Tor-
rance Superior Court not far behind.2 76 "'This [unavailability of civil
courts] could produce an environment in which consumer fraud and
other illegal business practices cannot be restrained, and where crimi-
nal matters emanate from frustration over an inability to reach civil
remedies, especially in domestic relations matters.' "277
There is no solution in sight for court overcrowding by three
strikes trials. While additional sales tax revenues have been
earmarked for district attorneys, public defenders, and sheriff's de-
partments to help them cope with three strikes, no additional funds
266. Crime Watch: Striking Out, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at B6.
267. Morain, supra note 7, at A21.
268. Webb, supra note 127, at A2 (citing California Legislative Analyst).
269. Id.
270. Richard C. Reuben, Get-Tough Stance Draws Fiscal Criticism, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995,
at 16, 16.
271. Morain, supra note 7, at A21.
272. Large Load of '3 Strikes' Cases Filed by Prosecutors, L.A. TiMrs, Apr. 23, 1994, at
B2.
273. Morain, supra note 7, at A21 (quoting Jim Fox).
274. Palermo, supra note 138, at 1.
275. Charles L. Lindner, With the Courts Crowded, Private 'Justice' for the Rich and
Famous, L.A. Tmns, Dec. 25, 1994, at M6.
276. Id.
277. Webb, supra note 127, at A2 (quoting Center for Urban Analysis).
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have been allocated to trial courts.2 78 The Judicial Council has esti-
mated that each one-percent decrease in guilty pleas will result in 1000
additional jury trials, consuming at least twenty judge-years and $16
million in court resources.2 79 The Los Angeles Superior Court has
reported that, in the first ten months of 1994, of which three strikes
was in effect for only the last seven, early case dispositions declined by
twenty-one percent.280 "'[W]hat good does a Constitution do,'" asks
Presiding Judge Robert Mallano of the Los Angeles Superior Court,
"'if we can't give people a civil trial?' "28
Once again, court overcrowding is a problem which can be
averted by GFI'. In contrast to three strikes, GFT would retain the
defendant's incentive to plea bargain. The greater discretion allowed
prosecutors by GFT would mean a much greater difference in the po-
tential sentence if the defendant chooses to bargain. As such, the de-
fendant would have much more to gain by bargaining, and thereby
avoiding trial. Resources would thus be conserved.
VI. A BOTCHED ATrEMPT TO VIOLATE THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION'S GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Paragraph (a)(5) of the Statute provides that credits for good
time served granted pursuant to section 2931 shall not exceed one-
fifth of the total term of imprisonment, and shall not accrue until the
defendant is physically placed in the state prison.8 As will be shown
in the following sections, the prevailing interpretation of this provision
is a violation of the California Constitution's guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the laws?8
A. Three Strikes Creates Two Distinct Classes
The only circumstance under which a person is placed in state
prison is after conviction and sentencing for a felony.8 Before sen-
278. Palermo, supra note 138, at 5.
279. JuDicARY COMM. REP., supra note 53, at 11.
280. Palermo, supra note 138, at 1.
281. Id. at 5 (quoting presiding judge of Los Angeles Superior Court Robert Mallano).
282. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(5). Paragraph (a)(5) applies only to good time
credits earned under Part 3, Title 1, Chapter 7, Article 2.5 of the Penal Code, commencing
with § 2930. Id.
283. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.(a) ("A person may not be... denied equal protection of
the laws .... ).
284. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) ("A felony is a crime which is punish-
able with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or public of-
fense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infractions."); id. § 19.2
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tencing, the defendant is either incarcerated in a municipal or county
jail, or released on bail or on his or her own recognizance. The provi-
sions of three strikes apply only to those convicted of a felony.285 So
individuals falling under three strikes will first have been detained in
jail or given presentence release, and then committed to state prison.
Time served and credits earned in presentence detention will be
credited towards the ultimate sentence,M6 and thus deducted from the
time to be served in state prison. Under the California Penal Code
prior to three strikes, good time credits could be earned under section
4019,v providing for credits of up to one day for every two served
before sentencing,288 or under sections 2931 and 2933,289 providing
for credits of up to one day per each day served after sentencing to
state prison.29 °
There are two existing interpretations of how paragraph (a)(5)
affects the grant of good time credits: the interpretation apparently
held by its drafters, and the accurate interpretation.
1. The accurate interpretation of paragraph (a)(5)
The Statute purports to limit good time credits earned under sec-
tions 2931 and 2933 to one-fourth of time served,291 and forbids the
accrual of those credits until the inmate is physically placed in state
prison.292 It makes no mention of section 4019,293 and so defendants
presumably continue to earn credits of one-half time served before
sentencing.294 Under this scheme, a defendant will earn credit of one-
half time served in presentence incarceration, but only one-fourth
time served after sentencing. Those defendants who are incarcerated
before sentencing will have an opportunity to earn more good time
credits compared to those who are not incarcerated before sentencing.
The more time spent in county jail, as opposed to prison, the more
("In no case shall any person sentenced to confinement in a county or city jail.., be
committed for a period in excess of one year .... ").
285. Id. § 1170.12(a) ("[I]f a defendant has been convicted of a felony.., the court shall
adhere to each of the following ... .
286. 1& § 2900.5.
287. Id. § 4019.
288. Id.
289. Id. §§ 2931, 2933.
290. Id. § 2933.
291. One-fifth of the total sentence works out to be one-fourth of actual time served-
four days of actual incarceration for one day of credit. Id. § 2931(b).
292. Id. § 1170.12(a)(5).
293. Id.
294. Id. § 4019.
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credits the defendant can earn, and the shorter the time of overall
incarceration. Thus, a felon who is incarcerated before sentencing
may serve a significantly shorter sentence than one who is not.295
2. An erroneous, but widely held, interpretation of
paragraph (a)(5)
The Three Strikes and You're Out Committee, among others,
seems to believe that the Statute eliminates the granting of any good
time credits before an inmate is physically placed in state prison. In a
campaign circular 2 9 6 the Committee describes the Statute as "re-
quir[ing] that at least 80% of a sentence be served before repeat seri-
ous/violent felons are eligible for parole."297 Only if absolutely no
credits are given outside state prison would this be true.
The Legislative Analyst agrees with this interpretation. In a de-
scription of three strikes published in the California Ballot Pamphlet,
the Analyst concluded that the offender "may not receive any credits
for any time spent in county jail before going to state prison."298 The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary likewise seemed to interpret para-
graph (a)(5) as limiting the sum of all good time credits to the twenty
percent of the sentence served in state prison.299
Under this interpretation, good time credits awarded under sec-
tion 4019 would be limited to misdemeanants; 0 ° felons who fall under
three strikes would not be able to earn good time credits during
295. Assume defendants A and B are arrested on the same day. Assume further that
they both will be convicted. Defendant A is immediately released on her own recogni-
zance. Each day defendant A spends incarcerated, she will spend in state prison. Defend-
ant B, on the other hand, is detained in custody in county jail pending his conviction and
sentencing. While in county jail, B earns good time credits of one-half time served under
§ 4019.
Two hundred forty-four days later, both A and B are convicted of the same offense,
and receive one-year sentences. A will serve her entire sentence in state prison, where she
may earn good time credits totaling only 20% of her sentence. In other words, A will serve
at least 80% of her sentence. Eighty percent of 365 days is 292 days, the number of days
that A will spend in state prison. B, having served 244 days in county jail and earned 122
days of credits, will be deemed to have served his entire sentence and released. B served
48 days less than A.
296. Yes on 1841: 3 Strikes and You're Out (Three Strikes and You're Out Committee,
Sacramento, Cal.) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
297. Id.
298. BALLOT PAwmET, supra note 97, at 33.
299. JUDICIARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 3 ("This bill would provide that a person
sentenced under the provisions of this bill ... may only receive sentence credits limited to a
maximum of one-fifth the total sentence.").
300. The provisions of three strikes apply only to those convicted of felonies. CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1170.12(a).
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presentence detention. Those felons who are detained prior to sen-
tencing, who serve part of their terms in county or municipal jail, will
not be able to earn good time credits during the portion of their term
they serve in county or municipal jail. They will thus earn fewer cred-
its and serve longer periods of actual incarceration. Those who are
able to gain presentence release, who spend their entire period of in-
carceration in state prison will have the opportunity to earn good time
credits over the entire period of their incarceration. They will thus
serve shorter periods of actual incarceration. The effect is that indi-
gent felons, who are unable to afford bail, and are thus forced to serve
presentence detentions, will be punished more severely than wealthy
felons.3o'
However, given the fact that the language of paragraph (a)(5) ex-
pressly limits its application to credits granted in state prison under
sections 2930 to 2933.6,302 and is silent as to credits granted in jail
under section 4019, this interpretation is clearly erroneous.
B. The Prevailing (If Erroneous) Interpretation of Paragraph (a) (5)
Violates the California Constitution's Guarantee of Equal
Protection of the Laws
1. The discriminatory grant of good time credits is subject to strict
scrutiny, as good time credits implicate a personal liberty
interest, which is fundamental under the
California Constitution
a. good time credits, even if state created, are a liberty interest
In Wolff v. McDonnell,30 3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
prisoner's interest in good time credits was a liberty interest.3 04 The
301. In September 1994, the California legislature passed, and Governor Pete Wilson
signed into law, Penal Code § 2933.1, limiting any and all good time credits earned by
persons convicted of violent felonies to 15% of time served. IAL § 2933.1. This analysis
therefore applies only to persons convicted of nonviolent felonies.
302. The reader may ask at this point why the drafters of the Statute took the trouble of
expressly providing that the operation of §§ 2930-2933.6 would be limited to time served in
state prison when those sections had always been so limited. I am equally perplexed but
conjecture that the drafters intended to limit all good time credits to credits earned in state
prison, but simply were not aware of the existence of § 4019. The fact that the Three
Strikes and You're Out Committee, which presumably knew the true intentions of the
drafters, ignores the existence of § 4019 in its interpretation of paragraph (a)(5) is entirely
consistent with this explanation.
303. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
304. Id. at 557; see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985) (holding good
time credits are liberty interests deprivation of which requires due process); Ponte v. Real,
471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985) (holding good time credits are liberty interests deprivation of
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State "may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened
prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behav-
ior," the Court wrote, "[b]ut the State having created the right to good
time[,] ... the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty.' "305
b. liberty interests of the type embodied in good time credits are
fundamental under the California Constitution
The discriminatory denial of a fundamental interest is subject to
strict scrutiny, requiring that the discriminatory practice be necessary
to further a compelling state interest.306 While personal liberty inter-
ests of the type embodied in good time credits do not appear to be
fundamental under the federal Constitution, °7 the California
Supreme Court has held that personal liberty is fundamental under
the California Constitution.
In People v. Olivas, 3°8 a nineteen-year-old offender brought an
equal protection challenge against his commitment to the California
Youth Authority because it subjected him to a term of incarceration
which requires due process); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-89 (1973) (holding
challenge to denial of good time credits is challenge to length of, or fact of, incarceration).
305. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. "We think a person's liberty is equally protected, even when
the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State." Id. at 558; see also Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365,374 (1971) ("[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitu-
tional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a
'privilege.' ").
Holding that good time credits constitute a liberty interest is undeniably logical; to
find otherwise would encourage states to undertake semantic gamesmanship. For example,
say Blackacre County has a policy of imposing relatively short sentences, but allows prison
wardens to arbitrarily increase any prisoner's sentence. Whiteacre County, on the other
hand, imposes long sentences, but is generous with good time credits so that, for those who
earn the full allotment of good time credits, sentences are equal to what would have been
received in Blackacre County. However, the warden of Whiteacre County Jail may arbi-
trarily deny good time credits. The effects of these two schemes are equal. See also
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489 (holding challenge to denial of good time credits is challenge to
duration of, or fact of, incarceration).
306. People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236,243,551 P.2d 375,379,131 Cal. Rptr. 55,59 (1976).
307. Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820, 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (interest in good time
credits not fundamental); see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (employ-
ing rational basis test in upholding discriminatory grant of good time credits); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (applying rational basis test to deprivation of liberty);
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966) (applying rational basis test to deprivation of
liberty). But see Bolling v. Manson, 345 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Conn. 1972) (grant of good
time credits in certain prisons but not in others was denial of equal protection); United
States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 15-18 (D. Conn. 1968) (imposition of longer sentences on
women than those imposed on men was denial of equal protection).
308. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
April 1995] 1087
1088 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
longer than the longest jail term a similarly situated twenty-one-year-
old offender would have received.30 9 After examining the sources and
history of personal liberty interests, the court stated:
We believe that [the California Constitution is] no less vigi-
lant in protecting against continuing deprivations of liberty
than [it is] in protecting against the initial deprivation of that
liberty. We conclude that personal liberty is a fundamental
interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected
under.., the California ... Constitution[ ].310
Four years later, in People v. Sage,311 the court reviewed a statute
which, like the intent of three strikes, denied presentence good time
credits to felons.3 12 "It is the distinction between the detainee/felon,"
the court wrote, "and the felon who serves no presentence time that
raises equal protection problems. 3 13 The court, in invalidating the
discriminatory practice, found good time credits to be an interest war-
ranting the application of strict scrutiny.314 In the absence of a suspect
classification, the application of strict scrutiny indicates that a funda-
mental interest is at stake 3
15
309. 1d. at 242, 551 P.2d at 378, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
310. I. at 251, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (emphasis added). While acknowl-
edging that federal courts have not treated personal liberty as a fundamental interest under
the federal Constitution, the court "exercise[d its] inherent power as a court of last resort
independent of fundamental interest determinations which may be reached by the United
States Supreme Court solely on interpretations of the federal Constitution." Id. at 246,551
P.2d at 381, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
311. 26 Cal. 3d 498, 611 P.2d 874, 165 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1980).
312. Id. at 507, 611 P.2d at 878, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 508 n.6, 611 P.2d at 879 n.6, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 285 n.6 (distinguishing McGin-
nis on ground that federal court used rational basis, while California applies strict
scrutiny).
315. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d at 243, 551 P.2d at 379, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 52; see also People v.
Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223, 233-35,599 P.2d 92, 97-98, 157 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903-04 (1979) (denial
of good time credits to mentally disordered sex offenders incarcerated for treatment up-
held under strict scrutiny); People v. Cook, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1467, 1470, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d
362, 363 (1993) (denial of good time credits to those under home detention program up-
held under strict scrutiny); People v. Poole, 168 Cal. App. 3d 516, 525-26, 214 Cal. Rptr.
502, 507 (1985) (denial of work-credits program to presentence detainee upheld under
strict scrutiny); People v. Jobinger, 153 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 200 Cal. Rptr. 546, 553
(1984) (denial of good time credits to mentally disordered sex offenders incarcerated for
treatment invalidated under strict scrutiny).
But compare In re Kapperman, 11 Cal. 3d 542, 522 P.2d 657, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1974),
in which the court, without discussing the applicable standard of review, held that the
State's failure to retroactively credit the time of presentence incarceration towards comple-
tion of the sentence lacked rational basis. I& at 548, 522 P.2d at 660-61, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
100-01. The fact that the State's actions did not have a rational basis foreclosed any analy-
sis under strict scrutiny. One can hardly argue that a law would fail under rational basis
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and yet survive strict scrutiny. Kapperman, however, seems to have spawned a line of
appellate court cases inimical to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (good time credits are liberty interest), and the California Supreme
Court's decision in Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976) (liberty
interests are fundamental under California Constitution).
For example, an appellate court, in In re Stinnette, 94 Cal. App. 3d 800, 155 Cal. Rptr.
912 (1979), reviewed the State's refusal to apply an increase in good time credits retroac-
tively. The court maintained that good time credits were "wholly amelioratory," not impli-
cating personal liberty interests. The denial of good time credits, the court therefore
concluded, warranted only rational basis review. Id. at 805-06 n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 914
n.4. In addition to Kapperman, the Stinnette court also cited McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263 (1973) (applying rational basis to denial of good time credit). Stinnette, 94 Cal. App.
3d at 805-06 n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 914 n.4. The Stinnette court, however, ignored both the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Wolff that good time credits were a liberty interest, and
the California Supreme Court's clear statement in Olivas that California would part ways
with the federal courts in applying the higher level of scrutiny to impingements upon per-
sonal liberties. The refusal to grant good time credits retroactively may indeed have been
constitutional, see People v. Sage, 26 Cal. 3d 498,509-10 n.7, 611 P.2d 874,880 n.7,165 Cal.
Rptr. 280, 286 n.7 (1980), but certainly not because the practice did not implicate a liberty
interest.
In People v. Hernandez, 100 Cal. App. 3d 637, 160 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1979), the defend-
ant challenged the enhancement of his sentence. His sentence had been enhanced for an
in-state prior felony conviction, despite his having served less than a year for that convic-
tion. Id at 643, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 610. In order for out-of-state convictions to qualify as a
prior felony conviction, the defendant would have had to serve a year or more. Id at 644,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 610. This difference, according to defendant, was a denial of equal protec-
tion. Id. at 643-44, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The court concluded that the differential treat-
ment of prior felonies for enhancement purposes did not implicate fundamental interests,
and was therefore subject only to rational basis review. Id. at 644 n.2, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 610
n.2. The court analogized it to the denial of good time credits (citing Stinnette) or credits
for time served before sentencing (citing Kapperman). Id "The Kapperman and Stinnette
cases, as well as the instant situation, concern the effects of certain legislative enactments
upon an individual's underlying sentence and actual time served and not whether that per-
son is to be deprived of his liberty in the first place." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, judging
from its opinions in Wolff and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (challenge to
denial of good time credits was challenge to duration of, or fact of, incarceration), might
disagree. So too would the California Supreme Court, which in Olivas held that the Cali-
fornia Constitution's protections against continuing deprivations of liberty were equal to
its protections against the initial deprivation of liberty. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d at 251, 551 P.2d
at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
The year after Stinnette and Hernandez were decided, the California Supreme Court
handed down Sage, in which the high court treated good time credits as a fundamental
interest. Sage, 26 Cal. 3d at 508 n.6, 611 P.2d at 879 n.6, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 285 n.6. The
holding in Sage overruled, sub silentio, Stinnette and Hernandez, at least as to the nature of
the interest embodied in good time credits, and the fundamentality of that interest.
Yet, in In re Bender, 149 Cal. App. 3d 380, 196 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1983), an appellate
court cited Stinnette for the proposition that good time credits did not implicate a funda-
mental interest. In Bender, the defendant argued under equal protection for the retroac-
tive application of increased work credits. Id. at 382, 385, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 802, 804. After
determining that the defendant was not similarly situated with inmates convicted after the
implementation of the new and increased work credit provisions, and that equal protection
arguments were therefore inapposite, the court went on in dicta to advise us of the reasons
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2. Three strikes's discriminatory grant of good time credits fails
strict scrutiny
In People v. Sage,316 the California Supreme Court held that the
denial of good time credits based on presentence incarceration is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The State had raised three justifications for its discriminatory
practice: First, good time credits were granted for rehabilitative pur-
poses, and the State could not "'presume to rehabilitate persons
clothed in the presumption of innocence.' "317 Second, presentence
detainees were occupied in preparing for and attending hearings and
trials, while convicts were perniciously idle of hand and mind.318
Lastly, presentence detainees already had a motive to behave in that
their good behavior would be considered by the court in sentencing.3 19
In response to the State's proffered justifications, the court ob-
served that,
[e]ach of the grounds advanced by the People... might also
be given for denying such credit to detainee/misdemeanants
as well. Yet detainee/misdemeanants are clearly entitled to
such credit under section 4019. The inescapable conclusion
is that the challenged distinction-between detainee/felons
and felons who serve no presentence time-was not based
on the grounds proposed.320
The State, the court concluded, "ha[s] not suggested, nor has our in-
dependent research revealed, a rational basis for, much less a compel-
ling state interest in, denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/
felons. '32 1 As Sage is on all fours with the prevailing interpretation of
paragraph (a)(5), the Statute represents an attempted denial of equal
why rational basis would have been applied to the already foreclosed equal protection chal-
lenge. Id. at 386-87, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06. The Bender court acknowledged Sage, but
the closest it came to distinguishing Sage was to say, "the [California Supreme] court indi-
cated strict scrutiny was appropriate. Nevertheless, the court refused to apply the credits
retroactively.. . ." Id. at 388, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 806 (citation omitted). It is quite a leap
from saying that a practice survived strict scrutiny to saying that rational basis should be
applied.
316. 26 Cal. 3d 498, 611 P.2d 874, 165 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1980).
317. Id. at 507, 611 P.2d at 879, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (quoting State's Petition for
Hearing).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id at 507-08, 611 P.2d at 879, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
321. Id. at 508, 611 P.2d at 879, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 285. While five Justices dissented on
other grounds, this holding was unanimous. Id. at 510-14, 611 P.2d at 880-82, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 286-88.
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protection of the laws. 3' This may be one instance in which faulty
drafting may prove to be the Statute's saving grace.323
VII. THREE STRMMKS'S PERPLEXING AND UNPRINCIPLED
TREATMENT OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
Paragraph (b)(3) of the Statute provides that juvenile adjudica-
tions are to be considered a prior conviction of a felony if:
(A) The juvenile was sixteen years of age or older...
(B) The prior offense is
(i) listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code, or
(ii) listed in this subdivision as a felony, and
(C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to
be dealt with under the juvenile court law, and
(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court
within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code because the person committed an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
324
This provision is neither logical nor principled.
322. May the legislature now raise or lower the amount of good time credits? Yes, of
course-they need only do so in a manner that is necessary to advance a compelling inter-
est. This is not terribly difficult, judging from the many times it has been accomplished in
the past. See supra note 315.
323. Is the correct interpretation of paragraph (a)(5) also violative of the California
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection? The State may argue that it has an interest
in retaining defendants in custody before and during trial, and that the relatively greater
good time credits for presentence detention provide an incentive for the defendant to stay
in custody. But it would be hard to argue that the practice is necessary to advance the
interest: The State already denies presentence release to defendants who pose a danger to
the public or a danger of flight. Or, the State may argue that, because presentence incar-
ceration has a punitive effect on defendants clothed with the presumption of innocence, the
State may mitigate the punitive effect through the grant of additional good time credits.
This argument, however, ultimately folds back on itself because the benefit of the credits
cannot inure to the defendant until the defendant is convicted, and therefore no longer
considered innocent.
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that anyone would ever bring the challenge.
The hypothetical defendant would be required to demand presentence incarceration. But,
again, the benefit of presentence incarceration, i.e., the additional credits, do not attach
unless the defendant is proven guilty. Demanding presentence incarceration in order to
accrue benefits which do not attach unless the defendant is guilty seems to be a concession
of guilt. It is hard to believe that any defendant, given the choice, would choose to be
incarcerated before conviction, and would thus be injured by the grant of additional credits
for that incarceration.
324. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3).
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A. It Is Perplexing
In paragraph (B), the Statute's drafters go to the trouble of in-
cluding as prior convictions not only those juvenile adjudications
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,325 but also the felo-
nies enumerated elsewhere in the Statute.326 By doing this, the draft-
ers sought to reach those defendants who, as juveniles, committed
adult crimes and were convicted in adult court.327 Two paragraphs
later the drafters require that the subject juvenile have been adjudged
a ward of the court "because the person committed an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.' '3 1 But if, for certain acts, a juvenile was convicted in adult
court, that juvenile could not also have been committed by a juvenile
court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 for those same
acts.329 By requiring that the defendant have been found to have
committed an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section
707, the drafters negate their inclusion of adult convictions two
paragraphs earlier.
What could the drafters have meant by including adult offenses in
paragraph (B), and then excluding them in paragraph (D)? Could the
drafters simply have neglected to include those sections in paragraph
(D)?33 0 Or did they not mean what they wrote in paragraph (B)?
Once again, it seems the Statute could have benefitted from fewer
drafters and more proofreaders.
325. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 707 enumerates offenses the commis-
sion of which would subject a juvenile to the possibility of trial in adult court. CAL. WELu.
& INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1995).
326. Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Statute identify violent and serious offenses-
namely, those enumerated in Penal Code §§ 1170.5 and 1192.7. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.12(b)(1), (2).
327. Convictions of juveniles in adult court were already covered by three strikes, as
they are treated as convictions, and not juvenile adjudications. See People v. West, 154
Cal. App. 3d 100, 108-09, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63, 68-69 (1984).
328. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3)(D).
329. To be prosecuted for the same act in both adult court and juvenile court would
violate the juvenile's protection against double jeopardy. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541
(1975).
330. If the drafters of this subsection simply forgot in paragraph (D) that which they
named in paragraph (B), they should not be too terribly embarrassed. The vast majority of
legislators reviewed (presumably) and approved it, some more than once. See supra notes
75-76 and accompanying text.
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B. It Is Unprincipled
Concerns have been raised that, because juveniles do not have
the full panoply of procedural rights afforded adults, particularly the
right to trial by jury,33' the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing
enhancements would amount to a denial of due process. The Califor-
nia Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that, "as juvenile court
adjudications do not provide the same due process protections as
adult court convictions, this provision may be unconstitutional.
'332
California courts have not addressed the issue. The California
cases that do exist in this area were decided under old section 667,
which provided for the use of juvenile convictions. California courts
have interpreted "juvenile convictions" to mean convictions of
juveniles who were tried as adults in superior court where they would
have access to a jury.333 Three strikes, however, contains language to
supersede these opinions, explicitly providing that juvenile adjudica-
tions pronounced in juvenile courts would also be considered prior
convictions, 3 34 and California courts will now be forced to address this
issue head on.
Federal courts of appeals have held that, in view of the fact that
even unadjudicated prior acts335 could be used to enhance sentencing,
the use of prior juvenile adjudications is consistent with due process
requirements.336 These federal court decisions, however, ignore a fun-
damental distinction between unadjudicated prior acts on the one
hand, and juvenile adjudications without juries on the other: Those
who committed unadjudicated acts were never brought before a court,
331. See In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 919, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 388 (1984) ("re-
luctantly affirm[ing]" lower court's denial of jury trial to juvenile).
332. JUDICIARY Comm. REP., supra note 53, at 10.
333. E.g., People v. West, 154 Cal. App. 3d 100, 108-09, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63, 68-69 (1984);
see also People v. Blankenship, 167 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 213 Cal. Rptr. 666, 673 (1985)
(holding conviction of 15-year-old juvenile in Wyoming adult court counted as prior con-
viction even though California does not permit persons under age of 16 to be tried as
adults).
334. CAL P NAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3)(C), (D).
335. "Unadjudicated acts" is used in this Comment to refer to acts upon which no court
has passed.
336. In United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1037 (1990), the court noted that it was within the bounds of due process for sentencing
judges, in enhancing the defendant's sentence, to consider factors which had not been fully
adjudicated with due process guarantees. This being the case, the court concluded that it
was not a denial of due process to use prior, nonjury, juvenile adjudications in sentence
enhancement. Id. at 215; see also United States v. Booten, 914 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Williams); United States v. Mackbee, 894 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 495 U.S. 962 (1990) (citing Williams).
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and therefore never required the protection of a jury. Conversely, all
those who stand accused before our courts have a fundamental right
to trial by an impartial jury.337
As a general rule, the government is not allowed to bargain with
citizens for their fundamental rights: "[I]f the only objective of a state
practice is to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights it is 'pa-
tently unconstitutional.' ",338 Among the constitutional rights thus
protected is the right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions. 339 For
example, in United States v. Jackson, the Court struck down a statute
that insulated the defendant from the death penalty in return for the
defendant's surrender of his or her right to jury trial.340 Exceptions
are made only when there is some compelling countervailing state in-
terest. For example, plea bargaining is permitted because of its impor-
tance to the criminal justice system 41 In the case of juvenile
adjudications, the state's interest in protecting the juvenile from the
stigmatizing aspects of a criminal conviction, and thereby facilitating
his or her rehabilitation, 342 was found to outweigh the juvenile's right
337. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI (guaranteeing right to trial "by an impartial jury" in "all
criminal prosecutions"); CAL. Col'sr. art. I, § 16 ("Trial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all ...."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("[Tjrial by
jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice."); In re Javier A.,
159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 928, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 395 (1984) (right to trial by jury was histori-
cally guaranteed to all, including juveniles).
338. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,33 n.20 (1973) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969)).
339. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968).
340. Id.
341. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
342. One California appellate court noted,
"minors charged with violations of the Juvenile Court Law are not 'defendants.'
They do not 'plead guilty,' but admit the allegations of a petition. Moreover,
'adjudications of juvenile wrongdoing are not "criminal convictions."' [Citation.]
As section 203 [of the Welfare and Institutions Code] states, '[a]n order adjudging
a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a
crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a
criminal proceeding.'" [ ] A distinction is made between criminal convictions
and juvenile adjudications because of the fundamentally different purposes the
two bodies of law are designed to serve. "Juvenile court proceedings are designed
for the rehabilitation of minors and not punishment." (In re Dennis J. (1977) 72
Cal.App.3d 755, 762 [140 Cal.Rptr. 463].) (Italics added.) .... There are numer-
ous procedural differences between a juvenile proceeding and a criminal proceed-
ing, most notably in the area of due process.
People v. West, 154 Cal. App. 3d 100, 107-08, 201 Cal. Rptr. 63, 68 (1984) (quoting In re
Joseph B., 34 Cal. 3d 952, 955, 671 P.2d 852, 854, 196 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350) (1983); see also
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1970) (describing ideal juvenile court as "an
intimate, informal protective proceeding").
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to trial by jury.34 3 And so states have been allowed to impose this
"bargain" on juvenile offenders: protection against stigma will be pro-
vided in exchange for the juvenile's surrender of his or her right to a
jury trial. Legal basis for the denial of so fundamental a right was
found by labeling juvenile adjudications "civil" instead of criminal,
344
despite the fact that a determination of the juvenile's guilt or inno-
cence would be made, with the juvenile's liberty at stake.345
Whether or not this bargain, in hindsight, was wise, it was made.
Having taken from the juvenile his or her right to the protections of a
jury in exchange for promises that the juvenile would be shielded
against stigma, the courts should now require the people to uphold
their promise; otherwise, three strikes's use of juvenile adjudications
for sentence enhancement will transform the categorization of juve-
nile adjudications as "civil" from legal sleight of hand into bald-faced
falsehood.3"
343. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 ("[J]ury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional
precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an
effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding.").
344. In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 963, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386,421 (1984); see also In
re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,789,241 P.2d 631,633 (1952) ("While the juvenile court
law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to
be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction
345. "[W]hile proceedings in the juvenile court are civil proceedings for the welfare of
the minor, the proceedings still deprive the individual of liberty, as do criminal proceed-
ings." In re Bradley, 258 Cal. App. 2d 253, 259, 65 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574-75 (1968); see also
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541-43 for a description of the similarities between proceedings
before juvenile court and those before criminal court.
The California Supreme Court, in addressing a juvenile's claim for due process protec-
tions, wrote, "'[t]here was no trial for any crime here and the [Juvenile Courts] act is
operative only when there is to be no trial. The very purpose of the act is to prevent a trial
.... '" In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320,330,228 P. 467,471 (1924) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905)). This statement is a classic tautology: In denying trial we
have not denied due process because no procedures were due since there was no trial. In
this respect, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice made the following observation:
In theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and de-
cisions made without observing ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would
act only in the best interest of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more
nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of law ....
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544 n.5 (quoting PREsnENT's COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMiN. OF JusTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: JuvENiLE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRnIm
9 (1967)).
346. If juvenile adjudications to come are to be undertaken with the caveat that the
results may be used against the minor in future adult criminal proceedings, perhaps the
"civil" label should be abandoned in favor of a label more descriptive of the true nature of
the proceedings: criminal. "'If you are going to give adult consequences, you should ex-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Californians are justifiably outraged by the level of violence in
this state. While the overall rate of crime has declined in the past
decade, the rate of violent crime has risen.347 This increasing violence
requires a response. But in grasping for an answer-any answer-we
Californians, through our legislature, have saddled ourselves with the
wrong answer in three strikes.
1. Three strikes does have the effect of preventing crime. But
by elbowing out more effective and more efficient alternatives, three
strikes does more harm than good. The sum of the Statute's short-
comings in effectiveness and efficiency is this: disproportionality. Of-
fenders who are repeatedly and incorrigibly violent cause enormous
harm, and should be put away until they are no longer able to destroy
innocent lives. Twenty-five years may not be enough in some cases.
Non-violent offenders should also be given sentences in proportion to
their individual offenses; the imposition of a blanket twenty-five-year
minimum only works to lift marginal deterrence. Each of these ineffi-
ciencies would have been eliminated by one of the alternatives to
three strikes. For example, GFT would reach first-time offenders, im-
pose sentences in proportion to the offense, and prevent more future
crimes than three strikes, all for about two-thirds the cost.348 Rainey
would focus on violent offenders and put them away for a longer time,
again at a lower cost.
349
2. Three strikes treads upon such fundamental beliefs and con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights that it could justifiably be viewed as a
repudiation of those protections against the state which Americans
have guarded so jealously. Equal protection is the right to be treated
with the same dignity as any other similarly situated person. Due pro-
cess is the protection against the arbitrary imposition of governmental
sanctions. The protection against cruel or unusual punishment allows
our society to simultaneously maintain its order and its humanity.
Two centuries ago, at this nation's inception, Benjamin Franklin
declared, "'[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.' "350 Surely we
tend adult rights.'" Charles Finnie, 'Three Strikes' Hits Hard in Juvenile Court, L.A.
DAILY J., Apr. 8, 1994, at 1, 4 (quoting Juvenile Court judge Leonard Sprinkles).
347. GREENWOOD Er AL., supra note 33, at 4-5.
348. See supra notes 135-270 and accompanying text.
349. GRENWOOD Er AL., supra note 33, at 26.
350. Vandy, supra note 204, at 883 (quoting Benjamin Franklin).
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can accomplish our goals in criminal justice without surrendering our
essential liberties. 51
3. Three strikes is, to be generous, sloppily drafted. The prob-
lem is not that three strikes is not perfect. The problem, rather, is the
utter pervasiveness of its flaws. Shortly after its passage, the Judicial
Council issued a memorandum concerning three strikes to all trial
judges, identifying twenty-six points of inconsistency, ambiguity, error,
and possible unconstitutionality, and advising the judges on how best
to handle these problems as they arise in the courtroom.3 52 If there
were a three strikes law for poor statute drafting, this one would qual-
ify many times over.353
While the voters who passed the three strikes initiative may not
have expertise in the nuances of criminal law, legislators have no such
excuse. Better considered, more effective, and more efficient alterna-
tives were available at the time of three strikes's passage, but the legis-
351. It may be said that the people have spoken, and have passed three strikes by an
overwhelming margin, so therefore let it be implemented. "'Any judge who plays games
with this law is thwarting the will of the people,'" says Sean Walsh, a spokesperson for
Governor Wilson. Reuben, supra note 270, at 17 (quoting Sean Walsh). "'Judges are
supposed to enforce the law, not legislate from the bench.'" ld. (quoting Sean Walsh).
We live in a democracy where the majority rules. The majority, in donning the mantle
of rulership, has entered a contract with the ruled. There are certain things the rulers may
and may not do. We took these limitations, put them on paper, and called it the
Constitution.
352. Judicial Council Memorandum, supra note 18.
353. In light of the drafting errors contained in the Statute, it was astounding to have
revealed in early November 1994, nearly seven months after the passage of the Statute,
that three judges were involved in its drafting. Dan Morain, California Elections/Proposi-
tion 184, L.A. Tnums, Oct. 19, 1994, at A3. Mike Reynolds told reporters that the judge-
drafters had asked him to keep confidential their connection to the Statute in order to
avoid questions on their impartiality should the Statute ever come before them. ld. It is
not known how anonymity would have increased impartiality in this case.
Highest ranking among the three judges is James A. Ardaiz, presiding justice of the
Fifth District of the California Court of Appeal, an acquaintance of Reynolds, and, coinci-
dentally, brother-in-law to California Supreme Court Justice Marvin Baxter. Dan Morain,
Judge Admits Role in '3 Strikes' Law, L.A. Iamas, Nov. 3, 1994, at A3. While keeping his
role in drafting the Statute a secret for over a year, Ardaiz said he had always intended to
recuse himself from cases involving "substantive" legal issues concerning three strikes. Id-
This declaration was made despite the fact that Ardaiz had publicly argued in the Statute's
favor while withholding disclosure of the fact that he had helped draft it. Id. Ardaiz's
involvement in the drafting of three strikes was admitted only after Reynolds revealed that
initial drafts of the Statute were penned by judges. Id. The revelation was made by Reyn-
olds in order to assure voters that the Statute was well written. Id- at A29.
The two other judges involved in the drafting of the Statute, R.L. Putnam, presiding
judge of the Fresno Municipal Court, and William Kent Levis, also a judge of the Fresno
Municipal Court, have been the subject of controversy as to the propriety of their hearing
three strikes cases. Tom Kertscher, Fresno Judge Opts Not to Hear Three Strikes Case in
Courtroom, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 7, 1994, at B1.
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lature simply opted for the one bill that could be invoked in a single
prepackaged, two-word soundbite. The passage of three strikes is
more a reflection of the rancorous, image-first mentality that pervades
political discourse in this state than of any process of prudent deliber-
ation that is presumed to take place in a legislative body.
It may be argued that our system of justice is flexible enough to
work around the problems of three strikes-that we can find some
legal way of ignoring the bad parts while implementing the good. But
surrendering the determination of justice to individual judges and
prosecutors not only defeats the purpose of mandatory sentence en-
hancement, it knocks our society several steps backwards towards the
age of rule by fiat. Further, the accumulation of ignored or less than
fully implemented laws and constitutional provisions could only speed
the entropy of our already-bloated system.
The good news in this case is that nothing lasts forever. All that
is needed to correct the course of our criminal justice system is a two-
thirds vote of the California Assembly. To accomplish this in an age
in which political discourse is dominated by in-your-face, bumper-
sticker epithets, Californians must resolve to demand quality and rea-
son.
Victor S. Sze*
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